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With mounting evidence that a coordinated attack by its Arab 
neighbors was imminent,1 Israel confronted a truism in 
international law: the prima facie illegality of any initiation of 
armed hostilities absent authorization by the United Nations 
(―U.N.‖) Security Council.2  Constrained by the obligation to 
conform its conduct to the use-of-force legal framework 
enshrined in the U.N. Charter,3 Israel was ultimately required 
to choose between two legal courses of action.  It could have 
presented the evidence of the imminent attack to the U.N. 
Security Council in an effort to obtain international sanction 
and perhaps assistance in preventing the attack; or, as it 
ultimately chose to do, it could have invoked the inherent right 
of self-defense codified in Article 51 of the Charter and thus act 
unilaterally to defend itself from what it concluded was an 
imminent attack.4 
Neither of these options was especially desirable for Israel 
from the perspective of international legitimacy.  Ideally, a 
state in Israel‘s position would choose the first option, a 
decision consistent with the fundamental international legal 
prohibition against aggressive use of force and the underlying 
purpose of the U.N. Charter: the prevention of war through the 
mechanism of the Security Council‘s collective process.5  
Israel‘s decision to act unilaterally6 and to confront the almost 
inevitable international approbation produced by a potentially 
 
1. See AVI SHLAIM, THE IRON WALL: ISRAEL AND THE ARAB WORLD 237-38 
(2000). 
2. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 182 
(4th ed. 2005) (―the general prohibition of the use of inter-State force . . . [is] 
part and parcel of customary international law, as well as the law of the 
[U.N.] Charter‖). 
3. ―The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with 
Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.‖  
U.N. Charter art. 39.  See also MARY ELLEN O‘CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND THE USE OF FORCE 223-25 (2005) (discussing Article 39). 
4. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter states, in pertinent part, that ―[n]othing 
in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations . . . .‖  U.N. Charter art. 51.  See also O‘CONNELL, supra note 
3, at 226 (discussing Article 51). 
5. See DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 278-83 (defining collective process, or 
―collective security,‖ as well as discussing its origin). 
6. See SHLAIM, supra note 1, at 241. 
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invalid invocation of the right of self-defense reveals, however, 
a perceived delta between the ideal and the geostrategic reality 
of the U.N. collective security process.  In the end, Israel chose 
to accept the burden of rebutting the presumption that a 
unilateral initiation of armed conflict is illegal, and to stand on 
its belief that the pre-emptive strike that initiated the Six Days 
War was a lawful act of self-defense.7 
Six years later, Israel once again faced mounting evidence 
of an imminent, coordinated attack from its Arab neighbors.8  
Unlike 1967, however, the price of fighting the international 
legitimacy struggle at this time outweighed the perceived 
strategic value of a pre-emptive strike.  As a result, Israel 
prepared for the inevitable and chose to forgo the military 
advantage that initiating hostilities would have undoubtedly 
offered.9  On Yom Kippur in 1973, the coordinated attack 
predicted by Israeli intelligence became a reality, and Israel‘s 
decision to avoid the difficult challenge of fighting against not 
just a battlefield enemy, but also the presumption of 
international illegitimacy, very nearly led to a military and 
strategic catastrophe.10  Nonetheless, Israel reaped virtually no 
benefit by attempting to claim the high ground of legitimacy 
and by waiting to become the victim of actual aggression.  
Instead, the collective security mechanism of the U.N. 
remained stalemated and Israel once again fought alone to 
achieve its strategic objective—only this time, by also having 
handed to its enemies precious operational initiative.11  When 
confronting subsequent threats, and equipped with the 
experience of pursuing both options, Israel saw little merit in 
foregoing a preventive self-defense legal strategy.  Thus, in 
1981, when the nation once again faced an imminent threat, 
 
7. Id. at 241-42.  See also DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 192 (arguing that 
―Israel did not have to wait idly by for the expected shattering blow . . . but 
was entitled to resort to self-defence as soon as possible‖). 
8. See SHLAIM, supra note 1, at 319 (noting that Israel ―had exceptionally 
detailed and precise information about the military capabilities and 
operational plans of the enemy‖). 
9. Cf. id. (arguing that, rather than choosing to forgo the initiation of 
hostilities, Israel simply failed to anticipate the attack because its 
intelligence branch misread the available information). 
10. See id. (―Military history offers few parallels for strategic surprise as 
complete as that achieved by Egypt and Syria . . . . [T]he Arab attack 
represented not just an intelligence failure but, above all, a policy failure.‖). 
11. See id. at 318-19. 
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Israel asserted the provisions of Article 51 to justify airstrikes 
against an Iraqi nuclear facility.12  This pattern has continued 
as the legal basis for virtually all military actions launched by 
Israel since 1973. 
Thirty years later, the United States faced a similar 
dilemma.  Convinced that Iraq was developing and stockpiling 
weapons of mass destruction (―WMD‖), and that those weapons 
could easily end up in the hands of transnational terrorists for 
use against the U.S. homeland, President George W. Bush 
concluded that military action to eliminate the regime of 
Saddam Hussein was essential to protect the nation.13  In 
retrospect, it is almost universally accepted that once he 
concluded that this threat existed, war against Iraq became 
inevitable.14  What was not inevitable, however, was that the 
U.N. Security Council would sanction such action under the 
authority of Chapter VII of the Charter.  Nonetheless, despite 
an unyielding belief that Iraqi WMD posed a legitimate 
threat,15 the United States, unlike Israel in 1967 and 1981, 
chose to pursue the path of collective security rather than that 
of inherent self-defense as the legal basis for accomplishing its 
strategic objective.16 
The Bush Administration‘s decision to oust Saddam 
Hussein from power would ultimately lead to Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.17  While President Bush achieved his objective of 
 
12. See DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 47-48 (describing Israel‘s act of self-
defense as ―represent[ing] another round of hostilities in an on-going armed 
conflict‖ between Israel and Iraq). 
13. See, e.g., BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATTACK 41-42 (2004) (―The mission 
in an Iraq war was clear: Change the regime, overthrow Saddam, eliminate 
the threats associated with him—the weapons of mass destruction, the 
terrorist ties, the danger he posed to his neighbors . . . .‖). 
14. See, e.g., id. at 27. 
15. See, e.g., id. at 92 (discussing President Bush‘s State of the Union 
Address where he asserts that Iraq has WMD).  See also Address Before a 
Joint Session of Congress of the State of the Union, 2003 PUB. PAPERS 82 
(Jan. 28, 2003). 
16. See WOODWARD, supra note 13, at 284-85 (discussing Secretary of 
State Colin Powell‘s unsuccessful meeting with the U.N. Security Council and 
the formation of the ―coalition of the willing‖).  See also infra note 38 
(discussing the ―coalition of the willing‖). 
17. See Address to the Nation on Iraq, 2003 PUB. PAPERS 281, 281-82 
(Mar. 19, 2003) (announcing the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom).  
See also O‘CONNELL, supra note 3, at 66-68 (discussing the March 19, 2003 
Presidential Address); infra note 37. 
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eliminating the Hussein regime, he utterly failed in his effort 
to obtain Security Council authorization for this action.18  This 
ultimately led to the creation of the ―coalition of the willing‖19 
and an assertion of pre-existing Security Council 
authorization20 that was regarded by most scholars and experts 
as incredible.21  Thus, in the eyes of many, Operation Iraqi 
Freedom destroyed not only the Iraqi military, but the 
credibility of the United States as a nation committed to 
international rule of law.  The perception of illegality regarding 
the United States‘s decision to initiate the war ran so deep that 
even the Secretary General of the United Nations condemned 
the action as a violation of international law.22 
From a pure international law perspective, the decision of 
the United States to persist in its collective security theory of 
legality is certainly understandable.  Although invocation of 
the 1990 Security Council authorization to use force against 
Iraq23 provided a dubious legal basis for Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, it nonetheless reflected a commitment to the 
collective security paradigm of the U.N. Charter.  It was the 
United States, after all, that submitted the matter to the 
Security Council, which essentially estopped the United States 
from then asserting an independent right of self-defense as a 
legal basis for its action.  Such a view is consistent with the 
general understanding of the relationship between the inherent 
right of self-defense and the collective security mechanism 
established by the Charter.24 
 
18. See WOODWARD, supra note 13, at 284-85. 
19. See id. at 285; infra note 37. 
20. See O‘CONNELL, supra note 3, at 54-55. 
21. Critics argue that the ad hoc arrangements between the United 
States, Micronesia, and Mongolia had little credibility as a coalition, and that 
the ―coalition of the willing,‖ see infra note 38, failed to meet the qualitative 
requirements of a multilateral intervention, see Sarah E. Kreps, Multilateral 
Military Interventions: Theory and Practice, 123 POL. SCI. Q. 573, 575 (2008-
2009). 
22. See Iraq War Illegal, Says Annan, BBCNEWS.COM, Sept. 16, 2004, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3661134.stm (―The United Nations Secretary-
General Kofi Annan has told the BBC the US-led invasion of Iraq was an 
illegal act that contravened the UN charter.‖). 
23. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991) (delineating the 
terms and conditions of the ceasefire that Iraq was to be bound by and thus 
ending the First Gulf War). 
24. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 286. 
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But international law—and, in particular, the law related 
to the use of force by States—is not an island unto itself.  As 
events related to the war served to remind the United States 
and the world, strategic legitimacy and international law are 
inextricably intertwined.  As Professor Anthony D‘Amato so 
eloquently noted: 
 
The question the political analyst will ask . . . is 
not simply whether the acts at issue have 
violated some preexisting norm but rather, 
whether expectations entertained by effective 
elites about what is permissible may be inferred 
from their behavior.  The question is eminently 
practical, for even those who do not regularly use 
the word ―law‖ in their discourse, and even those 
who snicker when others use it, must make 
estimates about the subjectivities of allies and 
adversaries alike.  These subjectivities 
necessarily include what those actors think is 
right.  In a world in which allies and adversaries 
do not submit to intensive interviews and rarely 
volunteer or are permitted to tell the whole truth 
(if any part of it), deeds—actions and reactions—
become one of the few available windows to what 
others are thinking, either consciously or 
unconsciously.25 
 
It seems undeniable that decisions about the legality of 
military force have such profound influence on the perception 
of international legitimacy.  The challenges for decision-makers 
confronted with the competing options of inherent self-defense 
and collective security are daunting.  In addition to the 
strategic cost-and-benefit calculus, the legal and political 
ambiguity surrounding the concept of self-defense adds 
significant complexity to the process.  Neither has the United 
Nations authoritatively narrowed down the interpretation of 
Article 51, nor do commonly accepted definitions exist to 
provide a clear distinction between preemption and preventive 
 
25. INTERNATIONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 53-54 (Anthony D‘Amato ed., 1994). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/18
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war.26  Like Israel decades before, the United States confronted 
a choice between the two competing theories of legality; and, as 
with Israel, neither seemed ideal.  Asserting a right of self-
defense as a legal basis for Operation Iraqi Freedom would 
have undoubtedly been considered overbroad by a majority of 
legal experts, and arguably inconsistent with the Charter 
paradigm once the Security Council had ―seized‖ the issue of 
Iraq.  But while we have learned much about the invalidity of 
the factual basis for launching the war since 2003, we have also 
learned that the U.S. effort to operate within the collective 
security framework of the United Nations fared little better.  
Indeed, much ink has been spilt by international law scholars 
and experts on the invalidity of the ―authorization 
resurrection‖ theory ultimately adopted by the United States.27 
What has received far less attention is the question of 
whether, from a broader perspective of international relations, 
the United States might have been better served by following 
the same course of action adopted by Israel in 1967.  There is 
virtually no question that an assertion of a right of self-defense 
as its legal basis for Operation Iraqi Freedom would have 
earned the United States widespread criticism, particularly 
from legal scholars.  But did the United States ultimately lose 
more than it gained by accepting the practical burden of 
convincing the Security Council that an authorization for the 
use of force was justified?  What seems clear is that either 
―legal basis‖ course of action involved risk once the necessity 
 
26. See DAVID M. ACKERMAN, CONGRESSIONAL REPORT SERVICE REPORT 
FOR CONGRESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PREEMPTIVE USE OF FORCE 
AGAINST IRAQ 3 (2003), available at 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS21314_20020923.pdf (―The exact scope of 
this right of self-defense . . . has been the subject of ongoing debate.‖).  See 
also DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 183 (discussing competing interpretations of 
Article 51). 
27. See generally, e.g., William C. Bradford, “The Duty to Defend Them”: 
A Natural Law Justification For the Bush Doctrine of Preventative War, 79 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365 (2004); Lori Fisler Damrosch & Bernard H. Oxman, 
Agora: Future Implication of the Iraq Conflict: Editors‟ Introduction, 97 AM. J. 
INT‘L L. 553 (2003); Sean D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 
92 GEO. L.J. 173 (2004); Winton P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The New Bush 
National Security Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 22 BERKELEY J. INT‘L L. 375 
(2004); Joel R. Paul, The Bush Doctrine: Making or Breaking Customary 
International Law?, 27 HASTINGS INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 457 (2004); Jorge 
Alberto Ramirez, Iraq War: Anticipatory Self-Defense or Unlawful 
Unilateralism?, 34 CAL. W. INT‘L L.J. 1 (2003). 
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for war had been determined.  Thus, it seems fair to ask 
whether asserting a self-defense basis for action could have 
produced second- and third-order effects that might have 
served U.S. and coalition interests better than pursuing the 
collective security course of action. 
The events surrounding Operation Iraqi Freedom, like 
those surrounding the alternative approaches adopted by Israel 
decades earlier, raise an interesting and potentially important 
question: should a State that confronts what it believes is an 
inevitable and necessary use of force to protect its self-interest 
always assume the burden of persuasion for collective action?  
If, as indicated by its subsequent actions, the United States did 
not consider such an authorization necessary,28 might it have 
been possible, at least in practical terms, to essentially shift 
the burden of persuasion to opponents of military action by 
invoking the right of self-defense, even if that invocation was 
considered by many to be premature?  Considering the reality 
that both the United States and the United Kingdom had 
already committed politically to the conflict,29 it is clear that 
any proposed U.N. Security Council resolution in opposition to 
the operation would have fallen victim to veto.  Thus, while 
critics could have challenged the assertion of a self-defense-
based right of action, it was not conceivable that their 
opposition could have been confirmed in the form of a U.N. 
Security Council resolution condemning that invocation.  How 
then might this burden-shifting have impacted the perception 
of legality for the inevitable operation? 
It is of course difficult in retrospect to ignore the reality of 
what actually transpired during the course of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, and in particular, the failure of the United States to 
validate its assumption that Iraq was continuing to develop 
WMD.30  But it is equally important to critique the process 
adopted by the United States from a prospective, rather than 
retrospective, point of view.  This Article will explore the 
relationship between the application of the U.N. Charter‘s use 
of force provisions31 and how compliance with those provisions 
 
28. See, e.g., WOODWARD, supra note 13, at 184 (describing President 
Bush‘s ―if-you-don‘t-we-will challenge to the UN‖). 
29. See id. at 178. 
30. Id. at 435. 
31. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (―All Members shall refrain in their 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/18
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impacts the ―International Public Information‖32 effort related 
to the decision of a state or states to use military force.  To this 
end, the United States‘s decision to seek U.N. Security Council 
authorization for the intervention in Iraq will serve as an 
illustration and provide context for the discussion.  The 
purpose here is not to validate or condemn this decision.  
Indeed, there are many plausible reasons why a state might 
pursue such a course of action, even when it assumes that force 
can be employed based on an independent source of legality, 
such as the inherent right of self-defense.33  Instead, the 
purpose of the Article is to simply explore whether the 
assumption that a state that plans to use force must always 
seek Security Council authorization is overbroad, and whether 
the structure of the U.N. Charter might even provide a subtle 
incentive for states facing a perceived threat to bypass the 
collective security apparatus in favor of assertions of self-
defense, thereby shifting the burden of persuasion to opponents 
 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state . . . .‖).  See also DINSTEIN, 
supra note 2, at 85 (discussing Article 2). 
32. International Public Information is the subject of ―a secret 
Presidential Decision Directive—PPD 68,‖ which was issued by President 
Clinton in 1999.  International Public Information (IPI) Presidential Decision 
Directive PPD 68 (Apr. 30, 1999), http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-
68.htm.  The purpose of the Directive was to leverage all components of the 
U.S. government in the effort to influence the international perception of U.S. 
policy and actions.  Id.  According to the Federation of American Scientists: 
 
The International Public Information [IPI] System is 
designed to ―influence foreign audiences‖ in support of US 
foreign policy and to counteract propaganda by enemies of 
the United States.  The intent is ―to enhance U.S. security, 
bolster America‘s economic prosperity and to promote 
democracy abroad,‖ according to the IPI Core Group 
Charter.  The Group‘s charter statess [sic] that IPI control 
over ―international military information‖ is intended to 
―influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning and 
ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, 
organizations, groups and individuals.‖  The IPIG will 
encourage the United Nations and other international 
organizations to make ―effective use of IPI . . . in support of 
multilateral peacekeeping.‖ 
 
Id. 
33. See DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 175 (calling self-defense a 
―fundamental right of States‖ for states‘ survival). 
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of the conflict. 
The authors acknowledge at the outset that considering 
the potential information payoff derived from such a policy and 
legal strategy might appear fundamentally inconsistent with 
the Charter‘s use-of-force legal framework.34  But our purpose 
is neither to endorse nor condemn that framework.  Instead, it 
is simply to acknowledge and consider the broader 
consequences produced by how states interpret and invoke that 
framework.  Nor do we believe that this is a purely 
retrospective issue.  Indeed, our purpose is more prospective.  
Like Israel in 1967 and President Bush in 2003, it seems that 
the United States, South Korea, and other like-minded allies 
are presently confronting their own potential use-of-force 
dilemma created by an increasingly bellicose and dangerously 
armed North Korea.35  If, at some point, the United States and 
its allies, committed to preventing the dangerous reality of a 
nuclear capable North Korea, decide that military action is 
necessary, would presentation of the issue to the U.N. Security 
Council be the wisest course of action?  It would certainly be 
difficult to ignore the reality that the Council is now seized of 
the issue.36  But it would also be difficult to ignore the reality 
that several permanent members would be highly unlikely to 
support an authorization for the use of force against North 
Korea. 
If, and the authors certainly hope this will not be the case, 
President Obama reaches his own ―decisive point‖ for taking 
military action, would a more effective course of action be to 
follow the Israeli approach from 1967?  Like Israel‘s actions, 
such an approach would undoubtedly produce widespread 
criticism.  But would military action following a failed attempt 
to obtain Security Council authorization be more damaging to 
the overall perception of credibility?  This is not an easy 
question to resolve, but if this Article does nothing more than 
to highlight the geostrategic reality that selecting a legal 
 
34. See id. at 85. 
35. See, e.g., Kwang-Tae Kim, South Korea Says North Fires Seven 
Missiles Off East Coast, CHINAPOST.COM, July 5, 2009, 
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/asia/regional-news/2009/07/05/214934/South-
Korea.htm. 
36. See S.C. Res. 1874, ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1874 (June 12, 2009) (The 
Security Council decided to ―remain actively seized of the matter‖ involving 
North Korea‘s nuclear program). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/18
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course of action is far from a ―zero sum‖ game—that following 
either course of action involves the inherent risk of perceived 
illegitimacy, and therefore that it might be logical to select the 
choice that mitigates that risk to the greatest extent possible—
the authors will have accomplished their limited purpose. 
 
International Legality and National Security 
 
Operation Iraqi Freedom37 provides a classic example of 
the profound relationship between the perception of compliance 
with international law and the legitimacy of actions executed to 
implement national security objectives.  The efforts of the Bush 
Administration to create a public perception of international 
legitimacy for the conflict— first by seeking to persuade the 
U.N. Security Council to authorize military action, and 
subsequently, through the conduit of the ―coalition of the 
willing‖38 and the not-so-subtle marginalization of the Security 
Council39—illustrate that the legal basis for military action is a 
critical component in shaping the overall perception of the 
legitimacy of state action to implement national security 
imperatives. 
Complicating the importance of the perception of legality is 
the reality that the use of military force to implement national 
 
37. See CATHERINE DALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., OPERATION IRAQI 
FREEDOM: STRATEGIES, APPROACHES, RESULTS, AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, at i 
(2009), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34387.pdf (stating that 
―Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the U.S.-led coalition military operation in 
Iraq, was launched on March 20, 2003, with the immediate stated goal of 
removing Saddam Hussein‘s regime and destroying its ability to use weapons 
of mass destruction or to make them available to terrorists.‖).  See also 
Address to the Nation on Iraq, 2003 PUB. PAPERS 277, 278 (Mar. 17, 2003) 
(giving a 48-hour ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and his sons). 
38. ―Coalition of the willing‖ is a term first used by President Bush in a 
speech at a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (―NATO‖) Summit in Prague 
in November 2002, in which he said that ―the United States will lead a 
coalition of the willing to disarm [Saddam Hussein].‖  Bush: Join Coalition of 
the Willing, CNN.COM, Nov. 20, 2002, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/11/20/prague.bush.nato (the term 
was used to refer to the forty-nine countries that verbally or militarily 
supported the 2003 invasion). 
39. See, e.g., NAT‘L LAWYERS GUILD, ATTACKING IRAQ, SUBVERTING 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 2, 
http://www.pegc.us/archive/Organizations/NLG_iraq_fact_sheet.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 18, 2009) (noting that Security Council members France, Russia, 
and China have consistently opposed U.S. intervention in Iraq). 
11
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or international security interests is rarely without 
controversy.40  This is the result of a simple truism: use of force 
is today considered a measure of last resort in seeking to 
achieve national or international strategic objectives.41  
Accordingly, the legitimacy of any employment of combat power 
by a state will inevitably be critiqued by testing its compliance 
with international law governing the use of force.  Operation 
Iraqi Freedom and the first Gulf War in many ways reflect 
opposite ends of this ―legitimacy‖ spectrum.42  However, the 
post-9/11 paradigm of treating transnational threats posed by 
non-state actors as ―armed conflicts,‖43 along with the 
continued risk of conflict triggered by nuclear proliferation, 
suggest that future military actions by the United States and 
other states may very well continue to tend towards the 
Operation Iraqi Freedom-end of the legitimacy spectrum.  
Indeed, the post-9/11 recommendations by the Secretary 
General of the United Nations that emphasized the need to 
enhance the responsiveness of the United Nations‘ collective 
security mechanism to such emerging threats, seems to reflect 
this reality.44  However, unless and until such reforms are 
implemented, the challenge in executing national security 
policy in a manner that is perceived as legitimate under 
international law will remain significant. 
 
40. See DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 124 (stating that ―the criminality of 
aggressive war has entrenched itself in an impregnable position in 
contemporary international law‖). 
41. See id. 
42. See id.; O‘CONNELL, supra note 3, at 22-82 (discussing the two 
invasions of Iraq as a case study in international legality for the use of force). 
43. See Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, Untying the Gordian 
Knot: A Proposal for Determining Applicability of the Laws of War to the War 
on Terror, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 787, 796-803 (2008).  See also Memorandum from 
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales to President George W. Bush, Decision 
Regarding Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the 
Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), available at 
www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.25.pdf (articulating 
the basis for the conclusion that Al Qaeda detainees are not covered by either 
Common Article 2 or the humane treatment obligations of Common Article 3 
of the Geneva Convention). 
44. See Patrick E. Tyler &.Felicity Barringer, Annan Says U.S. Will 
Violate Charter if it Acts Without Approval, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2003, at A10 
(―Secretary General Kofi Annan warned today that if the United States fails 
to win approval from the Security Council for an attack on Iraq, 
Washington‘s decision to act alone or outside the Council would violate the 
United Nations charter.‖). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/18
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How the international law regarding the use of force 
relates to this challenge—or, perhaps more precisely, how 
informational burdens of persuasion related to that law impact 
the relative perception of legitimacy—is therefore a critical 
issue in the intersection between international law and 
national security policy.  Using the example of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, this Article will question whether the diplomatic and 
associated informational courses of action adopted by the Bush 
Administration made the most effective use of the pragmatic 
burdens of persuasion related to articulating a legitimate legal 
basis for armed conflict.  The Article will suggest that asserting 
an alternate—and, in the view of many, an equally viable45—
theory of international legality might have enhanced the 
perceived legitimacy of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Finally, the 
essay will consider whether asserting a self-defense right of 
action in the face of an emerging threat could functionally shift 
the informational burden of persuasion to opponents of the use 
of military force, and how such a shift in relation to Operation 
Iraqi Freedom might have helped the United States obtain 
support—or, at a minimum, mitigate opposition—from 
traditional European diplomatic and security partners. 
This is not, however, an issue isolated to a retrospective 
assessment of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Indeed, as this Article 
was being written, North Korean leaders are threatening war 
against the United States, and President Obama has publicly 
stated that North Korea‘s nuclear ambitions pose a ―grave 
threat‖ to the world,46 and that the nation cannot be permitted 
to possess nuclear weapons.47  Should he conclude that the use 
of force is necessary to ensure this strategic imperative, 
President Obama could soon find himself confronting a 
dilemma similar to that faced by his predecessor.  Should the 
United States seek authorization for such a use of force 
 
45. See generally, e.g., PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS, ANDRU E. WALL & ATA 
DINLENC, THE FEDERALIST SOC‘Y FOR LAW & PUB. POLICY STUDIES, THE JUST 
DEMANDS OF PEACE AND SECURITY: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CASE AGAINST 
IRAQ (2002), available at http://www.fed-
soc.org/doclib/20070325_iraqfinalweb.pdf. 
46. United States President Barack Obama & Republic of Korea 
President Lee Myung-Bak, Joint Remarks (June 16, 2009), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-President-Obama-
and-President-Lee-of-the-Republic-of-Korea-in-Joint-Press-Availability. 
47. Id. 
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through the Security Council?  Or would a more effective 
course of action be to assert the right to act in individual and 
collective self-defense, and thereby shift the burden of 
discrediting this assertion to opponents of military action?  
Although a ―rearview mirror‖ perspective of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom renders it difficult to consider that event as a 
paradigm for the cost-benefit equation associated with such a 
course of action, the continuing reality of global insecurity 
makes it a worthwhile endeavor. 
 
I.  Background 
 
 Although the United States initially suggested that it 
was committed to obtaining authorization for the conflict 
through the U.N. Security Council,48 its inability to persuade 
fellow Council members that there was a legitimate causus 
belli ultimately resulted in a dilemma for the United States.  It 
was clear to almost all observers that by the time the United 
States sought and failed to obtain express Security Council 
authorization for Operation Iraqi Freedom, it had already 
committed to war.  What then could be asserted as a legal basis 
for the action?  And how could the United States proceed 
without implicitly undermining the United Nations collective 
security process?  The United States‘s answer reflected a 
schizophrenic reaction to its failure to obtain authorization.  Its 
refusal to revert to a pure self-defense theory of legality can be 
seen as a validation of the limits of such assertions and a 
 
48. See Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York 
City, 2002 PUB. PAPERS 1572, 1576 (Sept. 12, 2002).  In his address, President 
Bush expressed an intent to work and cooperate with the United Nations in 
regards to Iraq: 
 
My Nation will work with the U.N. Security Council to 
meet our common challenge.  If Iraq‘s regime defies us 
again, the world must move to deliberately, decisively to 
hold Iraq to account.  We will work with the U.N. Security 
Council for the necessary resolutions.  But the purposes of 
the United States should not be doubted.  The Security 
Council resolutions will be enforced—the just demands of 
peace and security will be met—or action will be 
unavoidable. 
 
Id. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/18
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commitment to continue to operate through the collective 
security process.  However, by using the 1990 U.N. Security 
Council Resolution authorizing the first Gulf War49 as a legal 
basis for its 2003 action, in spite of the fact that the Security 
Council had considered and rejected the call for a new ―all 
necessary means‖ authorization,50 the United States impliedly 
rejected the United Nations‘ use-of-force authorization process.  
Additionally, as if to complicate matters more, even after it 
sought a ―resurrected‖ Resolution 687 authority for action, the 
United States continued to suggest an independent right of 
individual and collective self-defense, as reflected in the 
following excerpt from a letter submitted by the United States 
to the Security Council immediately after initiating military 
action to depose Saddam Hussein: 
 
Iraq repeatedly has refused, over a 
protracted period of time, to respond to 
diplomatic overtures, economic sanctions and 
other peaceful means, designed to help bring 
about Iraqi compliance with its obligations to 
disarm and to permit full inspection of its 
weapons of mass destruction and related 
programmes.  The actions that coalition forces 
are undertaking are an appropriate response.  
They are necessary steps to defend the United 
States and the international community from the 
threat posed by Iraq and to restore international 
peace and security in the area.  Further delay 
would simply allow Iraq to continue its unlawful 
and threatening conduct.51 
 
While the public posture of the Bush Administration 
suggested that the final U.N. Security Council Resolution, 
which referred to ―serious consequences‖ for continued 
 
49. See S.C. Res. 687, supra note 23. 
50. See generally SEAN D. MURPHY, 2 UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2002-2004 (2005). 
51. Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of 
America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/351 (Mar. 21, 2003) [hereinafter Letter from the 
Permanent Representative] (emphasis added). 
15
2010] INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY 499 
resistance to inspections,52 served as a justification for the 
conflict, that Resolution standing alone never served as the 
United States‘s official theory of international legality.53  
Instead, in what many experts perceived as an act of 
desperation,54 the United States asserted that the ―serious 
breach‖ language of Security Council Resolution 1441 
essentially nullified the cease-fire of 1991, thereby resurrecting 
the original 1990 Resolution 687‘s ―all necessary means‖ 
authorization as a legal basis for military action.55  While this 
 
52. S.C. Res. 1441, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (Nov. 8, 2002) (stating 
that ―the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious 
consequences as a result of its continued violation of its obligations‖). 
53. See generally John C. Yoo, International Law and the War in Iraq, 97 
AM. J. INT‘L L. 563 (2003). 
54. See Mary Ellen O‘Connell, Addendum to Armed Force in Iraq: Issues 
of Legality, AM. SOC‘Y INT‘L L. INSIGHTS (2003), 
http://www.asil.org/insigh99a1.cfm (last visited Oct. 18, 2009). 
 
The Council passed resolution 1441 on November 12, 
2002, but it provided no new authorization for using force.  
It states in paragraph 12 that a meeting of the Security 
Council will be the first step upon a report by inspectors 
that Iraq obstructed their activities.  Russia, France and 
China have all stated they understood resolution 1441 
permitted no automatic use of force.  Subsequently, in fact, 
members of the Council were unwilling to adopt a proposed 
resolution that would authorize force to enforce Iraqi 
disarmament.  Resolution 1441 states affirmatively that in 
the event of a material breach by Iraq of its obligations to 
cooperate, serious consequences would follow.  But, again, 
the resolution does not say what serious consequences 
would follow.  Nor did it provide any right of unilateral 
US/UK enforcement. 
 
Id. 
55. See Letter from the Permanent Representative, supra note 51.  
According to this letter: 
 
Coalition forces have commenced military operations in 
Iraq.  These operations are necessary in view of Iraq‘s 
continued material breaches of its disarmament obligations 
under relevant Security Council resolutions, including 
resolution 1441 (2002).  The operations are substantial and 
will secure compliance with those obligations.  In carrying 
out these operations, our forces will take all reasonable 
precautions to avoid civilian casualties. 
The actions being taken are authorized under existing 
Council resolutions, including its resolutions 678 (1990) and 
687 (1991).  Resolution 687 (1991) imposed a series of 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/18
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may have been a plausible theory of legality, many other 
governments obviously considered it disingenuous,56 
particularly because the United States had aggressively 
pursued a new ―use of force‖ resolution even after passage of 
the ―serious consequences‖ resolution,57 but had abandoned 
that effort when failure seemed inevitable.58 
In seeking a Security Council resolution to authorize the 
conflict during its march to war, the United States clearly 
 
obligations on Iraq, including, most importantly, extensive 
disarmament obligations, that were conditions of the 
ceasefire established under it.  It has been long recognized 
and understood that a material breach of these obligations 
removes the basis of the ceasefire and revives the authority 
to use force under resolution 678 (1990).  This has been the 
basis for coalition use of force in the past and has been 
accepted by the Council, as evidenced, for example, by the 
Secretary-General‘s public announcement in January 1993 
following Iraq‘s material breach of resolution 687 (1991) 
that coalition forces had received a mandate from the 
Council to use force according to resolution 678 (1990). 
 
Id.  See also S.C. Res. 687, supra note 23.  Several of the conditions listed in 
Resolution 687 were later violated and then used by the Bush Administration 
as support for Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
56. See NAT‘L LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 39. 
 
Resolution 1441 represents a compromise between the 
French/Russian view and the American/British perspective.  
The Council acquiesced to the U.S. by deciding that Iraq 
―was and remains‖ in ―material breach‖ of prior resolutions, 
including Resolution 687.  It also decided that any future 
―false statements or omissions . . . and failure by Iraq at any 
time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the 
implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further 
material breach.‖  Finally, ¶13 of the Resolution recalls that 
the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face 
―serious consequences‖ as a result of its continued violation 
of its obligations.  The ―material breach‖ and ―serious 
consequences‖ language will be used by the United States to 
argue that the Security Council has essentially allowed it to 
use force in response to any Iraqi non-compliance.  
Moreover, the United States can also argue that the 
Resolution does not explicitly require another Council vote 
on authorization of military force, as the French and 
Russians had sought. 
 
Id. at 2. 
57. S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 52. 
58. See Yoo, supra note 53, at 563. 
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accepted the informational burden of persuading other 
members of the Security Council that military action was 
necessary to oust Saddam Hussein from power and to facilitate 
the accomplishment of the United States‘s national strategic 
objectives.  In retrospect, it is appropriate to question whether 
accepting this burden ultimately undermined the legality, as 
well as the legitimacy, for Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Would it 
have been more effective to ―shift‖ this burden to those 
members of the Security Council opposed to military action by 
asserting an alternative legal basis?  While this essay will 
necessarily summarize alternate legal theories for the conflict, 
it is not the intent of the authors to provide a comprehensive 
analysis of this body of law.  Instead, our purpose is to 
highlight the relationship between the selection of a theory of 
legality for the use of force as it relates to emerging threats and 
the development of international support for responsive 
military actions.  Ultimately, what we suggest is that, because 
there was no theory of legality immune to legitimate criticism, 
adopting a theory that shifted the burden of persuasion to 
those opposed to the conflict might have substantially 
contributed to the political objective of mobilizing international 
support for the conflict, or, at a minimum, mitigated the risk of 
international opposition. 
 
II.  Theories of International Legality for the Use of Force59 
 
Prior to World War I, the authority to wage war was 
considered a sovereign prerogative of nation-states.60  While 
 
59. This article is based on the premise that the U.N. Charter use-of-
force paradigm will continue to be regarded by the international community 
as the definitive source of authority for the legal employment of force by 
states, and that the United States will continue to aver from ―outside the 
Charter‖ theories of legality for the use of force.  For an excellent analysis of 
why the use-of-force paradigm reflected in the U.N. Charter is no longer 
viable, either legally or pragmatically, see Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of 
Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 539 (2001-2002) (arguing that 
the concept of self-defense reflected in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter is 
inconsistent with the pre- and post-Charter practice of states, and with the 
pragmatic needs of national security). 
60. See DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 75 (stating that ―the predominant 
conviction in the nineteenth (and early twentieth) century was that every 
State had a right—namely, an interest protected by international law—to 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/18
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international law did establish certain procedural 
requirements related to such decisions61 and provided the 
authority for determining the legal effects of war,62 there was 
virtually no requirement that states establish an international 
legal basis for their decisions to wage war.  Following World 
War I, the international community began to alter this 
paradigm in an attempt to limit the resort to war as a means of 
achieving state objectives.  These efforts culminated in two 
groundbreaking—but ultimately ineffective—international 
legal developments.  The first was the attempt to establish a 
collective security mechanism in the form of the League of 
Nations.63  The second was the attempt to outlaw war by treaty 
in the form of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.64  Unfortunately, the 
well intentioned efforts of the international community to 
ensure that World War I was truly the ―war to end all wars‖65 
proved ineffective, and the world once again descended into the 
abyss of global conflict.  While World War II clearly revealed 
the failures of the prior efforts to eliminate war as a tool of 
national policy, it also resulted in a renewed commitment to 
establish a truly effective source of international regulation on 
the use of force.66  The end result of this commitment was the 
 
embark upon war whenever it pleased‖). 
61. See, e.g., The Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, Oct. 
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2259, 205 Consol. T.S. 263 (Third Hague Convention) 
(mandating a declaration of war). 
62. See Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, Consol. T.S. 277 (Fourth Hague Convention). 
63. See League of Nations Covenant. 
64. See Treaty between the United States and Other Powers providing 
for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (Kellogg-
Briand Pact), U.S.-Fr., Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57. 
65. President Woodrow Wilson is generally regarded as given authorship 
to this quote.  See, e.g., RALPH KEYES, THE QUOTE VERIFIER 240-41 (2006).  See 
also, e.g., EDWARD M. COFFMAN, THE WAR TO END ALL WARS: THE AMERICAN 
MILITARY EXPERIENCE IN WORLD WAR I (1998). 
66. See INT‘L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE THIRD 
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 22-23 
(Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960).  See also U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1.  The U.N. 
Charter states that some of the purposes of the U.N. include: 
 
To maintain international peace and security, and to that 
end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention 
and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression 
of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to 
bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the 
19
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creation of the United Nations, and the vesting of that body 
with the principal responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security.67 
The Charter of the United Nations is generally regarded 
today as establishing the exclusive international legal criteria 
for determining—and by implication, critiquing—the legality of 
the use of force by states.68  The legal authority for states to use 
force is found in two principal articles of that treaty.  The first 
is Article 42, which provides that: 
 
Should the Security Council consider that 
measures provided for in Article 41 would be 
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it 
may take such action by air, sea, or land forces 
as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.  Such action 
may include demonstrations, blockade, and other 
operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members 
of the United Nations.69 
 
Because this article is found in Chapter VII of the Charter, 
Security Council resolutions invoking the authority of this 
article are customarily referred to as ―Chapter VII‖ mandates, 
and historically include the requisite ―all necessary means‖ 
language. 
However, it is essential to understand the relationship 
 
principles of justice and international law, adjustment or 
settlement of international disputes or situations which 
might lead to a breach of the peace . . . .‖ 
 
Id. 
67. See JOHN NORTON MOORE, FREDERICK S. TIPSON & ROBERT F. TURNER, 
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 47 (1990). 
68. While there have always been, and continue to be, theories of use-of-
force legality ―outside‖ the Charter paradigm—such as a customary 
international law right of humanitarian intervention—analysis of such 
theories is beyond the scope of this Article.  Furthermore, there is no 
indication that the United States has ever officially endorsed the validity of 
such ―outside the Charter‖ theories of legality.  For a comprehensive analysis 
of the international legal basis for Operation Iraqi Freedom, see Michael N. 
Schmitt, The Legality of Operation Iraqi Freedom Under International Law, 3 
J. MILITARY ETHICS 82 (2004). 
69. U.N. Charter art. 42. 
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between this article and other articles involving the Security 
Council‘s authority to maintain international peace and 
security.70  Because the Charter paradigm endeavors to ensure 
that resort to force in international relations is a genuine 
measure of last resort, prior to authorizing member states to 
use force under the provisions of Article 42, the Security 
Council must satisfy two conditions precedent.  First, the 
Council must make a finding pursuant to Article 39 that there 
has been a ―threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression.‖71  Second, the Council must make a finding that 
measures short of the use of force (such as sanctions, 
embargoes, etc.) would either be inadequate, or have already 
proved to be inadequate.72  Thus, while there is no requirement 
that the Council exhaust all non-use-of-force-methods prior to 
authorizing use of force to restore or maintain international 
peace and security, there must be an explicit determination by 
the Council that the use of anything short of force would be 
ineffective. 
The second provision of the Charter related to the use of 
force is Article 51, which provides: 
 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair 
the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security.  
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of 
this right of self-defence shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council and shall not in 
any way affect the authority and responsibility of 
the Security Council under the present Charter 
to take at any time such action as it deems 
necessary in order to maintain or restore 
 
70. See generally DINSTEIN, supra note 2. 
71. U.N. Charter art. 39.  This article, also known as the ―Collective 
Peace Theory,‖ states that ―[t]he Security Council shall determine the 
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression 
and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in 
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international 
peace and security.‖ 
72. Id. art. 42. 
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international peace and security.73 
 
Article 51 includes several critical sub-provisions related to 
the authority of states to engage in armed conflict.  First and 
foremost, it was included in the Charter as an express 
recognition that, even though the Security Council was vested 
with ―primary‖74 responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, member states would never 
be divested of their individual right to defend themselves 
against aggression.  Second, this article explicitly endorsed the 
authority of states to act collectively in response to aggression.  
Prior to this development, there was virtually no dispute that 
states had the authority to defend themselves against 
aggression.75  Indeed, the article‘s reference to an ―inherent‖ 
right has traditionally been regarded as an acknowledgment 
that the authority to act in self-defense was an essential aspect 
of sovereignty, and not a ―right‖ established by the Charter.76  
But Article 51 went one step further by acknowledging the 
right of collective self-defense.77  In short, this was an explicit 
effort to allow the ―good‖ big guys to help the ―good‖ little guys 
against the ―bad‖ big guys—a theory that has been employed 
by the United States to justify initial actions in several major 
conflicts, including Korea, Vietnam, and the first Gulf War.78  
It seems clear from the terms of the article that exercise of this 
right was intended to be a temporary measure pending 
assumption of the security situation by the Security Council.  
However, there is no stated limit to the recognized authority of 
states to act in their own self-defense or in collective defense 
against aggression. 
 
73. Id. art. 51. 
74. Id.  See also U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1 (stating that ―[i]n order to 
ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer 
on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties 
under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf‖). 
75. See Glennon, supra note 59, at 541-42 (discussing the traditionally 
understood requirement of ―armed attack‖ as the trigger for the right of self-
defense). 
76. See Leo Van Den Hole, Anticipatory Self-Defence Under International 
Law, 19 AM. U. INT‘L L. REV. 69, 73 (2003). 
77. See DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 178-79. 
78. See generally id. 
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Perhaps the most controversial aspect of Article 51 has 
been the ―trigger‖ for when a state or states may rely on this 
authority for the use of force.79  The plain language of the 
article refers to an ―armed attack‖ as the condition precedent 
for the lawful invocation of this authority.80  However, this 
authority has historically been interpreted more expansively 
than this language suggests.81  Under customarily accepted 
theories of international law, the ―armed attack‖ provision is 
satisfied when such an attack is ―imminent.‖82  Although the 
definition of this term has always been the source of some 
debate around the edges, the essence of the ―imminent attack‖ 
standard has historically been understood as allowing states to 
act in individual or collective self-defense when they determine 
that an act of illegal aggression is immediately impending and 
inevitable.83 
Historically, narrowly defining the scope of individual and 
collective self-defense authority was considered essential to 
prevent abuse of that authority as a subterfuge for acts of 
 
79. See id. at 183 (arguing that states may only rely upon self-defense as 
authority for a use of force where an ―armed attack‖ has, in fact, occurred). 
80. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
81. See generally DINSTEIN, supra note 2; Van Den Hole, supra note 76. 
82. See DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 182 (suggesting that ―the imminence 
of an armed attack . . . does indeed justify an early response by way of 
interceptive self-defence‖).  See also THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002), available at 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf; Yoo, supra 
note 53, at 563, 571-72.  The George W. Bush Administration articulated the 
U.S. position post- 9/11, in regards to the issue of ―imminence‖: 
 
For centuries, international law recognized that nations 
need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take 
action to defend themselves against forces that present an 
imminent danger of attack.  Legal scholars and 
international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of 
preemption on the existence of an imminent threat—most 
often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces 
preparing to attack. 
 
THE WHITE HOUSE, supra, at 15. 
83. See generally IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF 
FORCE BY STATES (1963).  See also DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 182 (stressing 
that a state may only assert self-defense as a lawful basis for a use of force 
when there is an imminent armed attack and there is ―no longer a mere 
threat‖). 
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illegal aggression.84  However, it seems apparent that 
endorsing a limited scope of self-defense was only one aspect of 
preventing such abuse.  The language of Article 51 illustrates a 
construct that acknowledges the inherent authority of states to 
make the initial judgment of when an action of self-defense is 
authorized, but then relies upon the collective security 
mechanism established by the Charter—i.e., the Security 
Council—to critique that judgment, and, where necessary, take 
actions to reverse an unjustified assertion of the inherent right 
of self-defense.85  Accordingly, any state asserting an inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defense pursuant to Article 
51, as a legal basis for military action, is obligated to 
immediately report the action to the Security Council.86  The 
authority for such action may be subsequently superseded if, in 
response to such a report, the Security Council authorizes 
measures to restore international peace and security.  Thus, 
the Security Council serves as the primary monitor for the 
legitimate exercise of Article 51 authority.87 
It is therefore apparent that international law does not 
grant states carte blanche authority to invoke the inherent 
 
84. See generally Van Den Hole, supra note 76. 
85. The text of Article 51 reflects an obvious balance between the 
authority of states to make this initial self-defense judgment and the 
complementary authority of the Security Council to critique that judgment 
and respond as it deems necessary to address the security situation. 
 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed 
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until 
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security.  Measures taken 
by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall 
be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall 
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the 
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any 
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain 
or restore international peace and security. 
 
U.N. Charter art. 51. 
86. Id. 
87. See id. arts. 24, 39.  Article 39 states that ―[t]he Security Council 
shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, 
or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.‖  U.N. Charter art. 39. 
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right of individual or collective self-defense, but instead, places 
limits on that right through both customary definitions related 
to legitimate invocations and the grant of authority to the 
Security Council to functionally assume authority over 
situations triggering state invocation of this right.  However, it 
is equally apparent that states are vested with the authority—
and, from their individual perspectives, the obligation—to 
interpret conditions establishing a prima facie trigger of this 
right.  Like the invocation of any right provided by law, the 
further removed the invocation becomes from accepted 
definitions, the more difficult it becomes for the party invoking 
the law to sustain support for that interpretation.  However, 
because of the deliberate and unquestioned intertwining of 
state authority to act in self-defense and Security Council 
authority to ensure international peace and security, the 
practical inter-relationship of these authorities produces 
significant informational second- and third-order effects. 
 
III.  Burdens of Persuasion and the U.S. Approach to Operation 
Iraqi Freedom 
 
Reflecting back on the strategy employed by the United 
States to garner international support for military action 
against Iraq, it is virtually impossible to dispute an initial 
policy preference in favor of obtaining a use-of-force 
authorization from the Security Council.  To this end, the 
United States effectively lobbied the Council to pass Resolution 
1441.88  This Resolution, which was touted extensively by the 
Bush Administration during the build-up to the conflict, noted 
Iraq‘s continuing violation of previous Security Council 
Resolutions; found Iraq in ―material breach‖ of prior obligations 
 
88. S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 52.  The Security Council held Iraq in 
―material breach‖ of its obligations under previous resolutions and 
consequently decided to afford it a ―final opportunity to comply‖ with its 
disarmament obligations, which had been established in Resolution 687 
(1991).  Id. ¶ 2.  See also S.C. Res. 687, supra note 23.  By its unanimous 
adoption of Resolution 1441, the Council ordered that the resumed 
inspections begin within forty-five days, and also decided that it would 
convene immediately upon the receipt of any reports from inspection 
authorities stating that Iraq was interfering with their activities.  S.C. Res. 
1441, supra note 52, ¶ 5.  It recalled, in that context, that the Council had 
repeatedly warned Iraq that it would face ―serious consequences‖ as a result 
of continued violations.  Id. ¶ 13. 
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imposed by the Security Council; granted Iraq a ―final 
opportunity to comply with . . . disarmament obligations‖;89 and 
―recalled‖ that the Security Council had repeatedly warned 
Iraq that it could face ―serious consequences‖ for continued 
non-compliance with prior Security Council Resolutions.90 
Experts in international law would ostensibly have a 
simple explanation for why the United States chose the 
―collective security‖ path: it was the path most consistent with 
international law.  This indeed may be true, especially 
considering the undisputed fact that the United States had 
been working within that process since the crisis with Iraq 
began in 1990.  However, it is also undisputed that, by 
following that path, the United States in effect accepted a 
burden of persuasion—a burden that it ultimately failed to 
satisfy.91  Contrary to the arguments ultimately advanced by 
the United States and other members of the Coalition, it is 
highly questionable whether Resolution 1441 provided a 
genuine legal basis for military action against Iraq.92  In fact, 
although the Bush Administration routinely cited the ―material 
breach‖ and ―serious consequences‖ language of that 
Resolution, the United States never claimed that the 
Resolution, standing alone, established such a basis.  Even 
after failing to secure a subsequent ―all necessary means‖ 
resolution from the Security Council, with the accordant 
declaration by President Bush that the Security Council had 
―not lived up to its responsibilities,‖93 the United States 
continued to assert a basis of international legality firmly 
rooted in the U.N. Charter use-of-force paradigm.  In a scarcely 
publicized letter issued after the initiation of combat operations 
in Iraq and written by U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations 
John Negroponte to the Secretary General of the United 
Nations, the United States cited as its international legal basis 
for the action the prior ―all necessary means‖ Security Council 
resolution from the first Gulf War: 
 
 
89. S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 52, ¶ 2. 
90. Id. ¶ 13. 
91. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 53, at 563. 
92. See generally Schmitt, supra note 68. 
93. Address to the Nation on Iraq, supra note 37. 
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The actions being taken are authorized under 
existing Council resolutions: including resolution 
678 (1990) and resolution 687 (1991).  Resolution 
687 imposed a series of obligations on Iraq, 
including, most importantly, extensive 
disarmament obligations, that were the 
conditions of the cease-fire established under it.  
It has been long recognized and understood that 
a material breach of these obligations removes 
the basis of the ceasefire and revives the 
authority to use force under resolution 678 
(1990).  This has been the basis for coalition use 
of force in the past and has been accepted by the 
Council, as evidenced, for example, by the 
Secretary General‘s public announcement in 
January 1993 following Iraq‘s material breach of 
resolution 687 (1991) that coalition forces had 
received a mandate from the Council to use force 
according to resolution 678 (1990).94 
 
This letter indicates quite persuasively that the United 
States was unwilling to pursue an ―extra-Charter‖ legal theory 
for Operation Iraqi Freedom.95  However, this excerpt also 
provides conclusive evidence of the Bush Administration‘s 
recognition that Resolution 1441 did not, standing alone, 
provide the authority to initiate hostilities against Iraq, but 
only added weight to the Resolution 687 ―resurrection‖ 
argument, to which Coalition members were forced to resort. 
The failure of the United States to secure passage of a new 
use-of-force resolution following the unanimous passage of 
Resolution 1441, and the subsequent need to resort to reliance 
on Resolutions 67896 and 687 as a legal basis for military action 
 
94. Letter from the Permanent Representative, supra note 51. 
95. See Carsten Stahn, Enforcement of the Collective Will After Iraq, 97 
AM. J. INT‘L L. 804, 807 (2003) (―Furthermore, hegemonist policies were 
placed within, and not outside, the law.  Importantly, all the actors involved . 
. . argued from within, not outside, the system.  This practice underlines that 
the normativity of the Charter framework was not itself called into 
question.‖). 
96. S.C. Res. 678, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (authorizing states to use 
―all necessary means to uphold and implement‖ prior resolutions directing 
Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait). 
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against Iraq, reveals the consequence of accepting the collective 
security burden of persuasion.  There is virtually no doubt that 
the United States recognized, even at the time of its passage, 
that Resolution 1441 failed to provide sufficient authority for 
use of force against Iraq.  Indeed, the Resolution was explicit in 
its requirement that the Security Council would take 
additional action in the event of further Iraqi non-compliance, 
and that other permanent members of the Council had relied 
upon this to support their views on the invalidity of a 
subsequent resort to Resolution 687.97  Instead, it appears that 
 
97. See Joint Declaration From Russia, Germany and France (Feb. 11, 
2003) (Russ.), 
http://www.ln.mid.ru/bl.nsf/900b2c3ac91734634325698f002d9dcf/3fbc1d99baf
e867843256cca004a4865?OpenDocument.  This declaration noted: 
 
Russia, Germany and France, in close coordination, 
reaffirm that disarming Iraq, in accordance with the 
relevant UN resolutions since U.N. Resolution 687, is the 
common objective of the international community and that 
it must be achieved as soon as possible. 
There is a debate on how this should be done. This 
debate must continue in the spirit of friendship and respect 
that characterises our relations with the United States and 
other countries.  Any solution must be inspired by the 
principles of the United Nations charter as were recently 
quoted by the secretary general Kofi Annan. 
U.N. Resolution 1441, adopted unanimously by the U.N. 
Security Council, provides a framework of which the 
potential has not yet been thoroughly exploited. 
The inspections led by the U.N. Monitoring, Verification 
and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have already 
produced results.  Russia, Germany and France favour the 
continuation of the inspections and a substantial 
reinforcement of their human and technical capacities 
through all possible means and in liaison with the 
inspectors, in the framework of the U.N. resolution 1441. 
There is still an alternative to war.  The use of force can 
only be considered as a last resort.  Russia, Germany and 
France are determined to ensure that everything possible is 
done to disarm Iraq peacefully. 
For the inspections to be completed, it is up to Iraq to 
actively cooperate with the IAEA and the UNMOVIC.  Iraq 
must fully accept its responsibilities. 
Russia, Germany and France note that the position they 
are expressing is similar to that of a large number of 
countries within the Security Council. 
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the United States considered Resolution 1441 as an important 
aspect of ―setting the conditions‖ for the use-of-force 
authorization that it sought, but ultimately failed, to obtain.98  
In selecting this legal authorization course of action, the 
United States accepted the burden of persuading other 
members of the Security Council not only that the use of 
military force against Iraq was justified as a collective security 
enforcement measure under Article 42 of the Charter, but also 
that the use of force must proceed according to a timetable 
dictated by the United States and its Coalition partners.99 
Perhaps the Bush Administration genuinely believed that 
it would prevail in carrying this burden of persuasion.  
Certainly the build-up to the causus belli presentation by 
Secretary of State Colin Powell reflected an all-out effort by the 
United States to satisfy this burden.100  While there has been 
much criticism directed at the veracity of the information 
presented, there has been little consideration of the practical 
corner the United States effectively backed itself into through 
this process.  By accepting the burden of persuasion, the 
United States conceded to opponents of military action the de 
facto power to define both legality and legitimacy.  Only by 
satisfying this burden vis-a-vis the four other permanent 
members of the Security Council101—and thereby eliminating 
 
Id. 
98. Colin Powell, Sec‘y of State, Address to the United Nations Security 
Council (Feb. 5, 2003), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/05/iraq.usa. 
99. Bush‟s Speech on Iraq: “Saddam Hussein and His Sons Must Leave”, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2003, at A14. 
100. See Powell‟s Address, Presenting “Deeply Troubling” Evidence on 
Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2003, at A18. 
101. The composition of the Security Council is set forth as the following: 
 
The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the 
United Nations.  The Republic of China, France, the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of 
America shall be permanent members of the Security 
Council.  The General Assembly shall elect ten other 
Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent 
members of the Security Council, due regard being specially 
paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of 
the United Nations to the maintenance of international 
peace and security and to the other purposes of the 
Organization, and also to equitable geographical 
distribution. 
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the risk of veto—could the United States achieve the objective 
that it imposed upon itself to obtain a use-of-force resolution.102  
Certainly, achieving this objective would have provided a 
virtually indisputable international legal basis for military 
action against Iraq, eviscerating opposition to the action.  In 
this regard, the effort does appear logical.  However, the 
consequences of failing to obtain such an unassailable legal 
basis for military action calls into question the wisdom of the 
legal strategy adopted by the United States. 
Consider the ultimate consequence of this course of action.  
The United States made a determined effort to obtain a new 
use-of-force resolution.103  Nonetheless, opponents of the war, 
the timetable, or both, remained unconvinced that such an 
authorization was justified.  As a result, several permanent 
members of the Security Council made it well known that 
should the United States or the United Kingdom table a use-of-
 
 
U.N. Charter art. 23, ¶ 1. 
 
The voting process for the Security Council is as follows: 
 
Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote. 
 
Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters 
shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members. 
 
Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters 
shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members 
including the concurring votes of the permanent members; 
provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under 
paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain 
from voting. 
 
U.N. Charter art. 27, ¶¶ 1-3. 
102. It is, perhaps, possible that the Bush Administration actually 
anticipated the ultimate failure to achieve Security Council consensus on the 
need for military action against Iraq.  Perhaps this was part of a broader 
strategy to marginalize the significance of the Council.  This seems somewhat 
consistent with President Bush‘s reaction to the inability to obtain a new use-
of-force resolution, in which he condemned the collective security process as a 
failure.  However, it seems far more plausible that the President genuinely 
believed that Secretary of State Powell‘s presentation would produce the 
desired consensus. 
103. United States Reportedly Gaining Security Council Support, UN 
WIRE, Oct. 25, 2002, 
http://www.unwire.org/unwire/20021025/29875_story.asp. 
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force resolution, they would exercise their veto power to ensure 
it did not pass.104  As the conflict drew ever closer based on the 
timetable announced by President Bush, the United States was 
left with few options.  It could test the commitment of these 
opponents to the conflict by tabling a new use-of-force 
resolution; but if their opposition proved genuine, the result 
would be disastrous—a failed use-of-force resolution on the eve 
of initiating the conflict.  As is now well-known, the United 
States and its coalition partners chose not to assume this risk.  
Instead, they accepted the inability to satisfy the burden of 
persuasion, condemned the collective security process as a 
failure, and then resorted to a questionable theory as their 
international legal basis for the military action that was, by 
that point, inevitable.  Thus, while avoiding the most 
problematic outcome—the inability to obtain passage of a new 
use-of-force resolution—the course of action pursued by the 
United States ultimately armed opponents to Operation Iraqi 
Freedom with the ability to assert international illegality as 
the result of the decision by the United States to abandon the 
Security Council process.105 
It is plausible to argue that, by initially attempting to 
obtain a use-of-force resolution, the United States validated the 
benefit of the collective security process.  An equally plausible 
argument, however, recognizes that, by abandoning that 
process, the United States undermined the credibility of the 
U.N. collective security system.  Neither judgment is relevant 
to this analysis.  Instead, the potential consequence of 
approaching the conflict with Iraq from a different perspective, 
and thereby shifting the burden of persuasion from the 
proponent of military action to the opponents, will be 
 
104. See Germany Rules Out Iraq War Support, BBCNEWS.COM, Jan. 22, 
2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2682313.stm (Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder declared that Germany intended to abstain in a future vote in the 
Security Council.  Germany does not have veto power in the Security 
Council).  See also Quelles Que Soient Les Circonstances, la France Votera 
Non [Whatever the Circumstances, France Will Vote No], LE MONDE, Mar. 11, 
2003 (Fr.), available at 
http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2003/03/11/quelles-que-soient-les-
circonstances-la-france-votera-non_312437_3210.html (President Chirac 
stated that ―France will vote ‗no‘ because she considers this evening that 
there is no need to make a war to achieve the goal we set ourselves, that is to 
say the disarmament of Iraq‖ (translated by author)). 
105. See Tyler & Barringer, supra note 44. 
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considered. 
 
IV.  Enhancing Legitimacy by Shifting the Pragmatic Burden 
of Persuasion Through the Auspices of Article 51 
 
It is a well-established tenet of international law that the 
inherent right of individual and collective self-defense codified 
in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter provides limited authority to 
engage in armed action absent Security Council 
authorization.106  This authority, however, has been historically 
limited to a response to actual or imminent armed attack.107  
Although the concept of an imminent attack has traditionally 
been narrowly interpreted, it is plausible that the United 
States could have proffered this rationale as a legal basis for 
military action against Iraq.  Indeed, the United States 
suggested that it was invoking this authority, at least in part, 
in the notice it ultimately submitted to the Security Council 
after Operation Iraqi Freedom began.108 
It is not the intent of this essay to extensively critique the 
legitimacy of this theory of legality.  Indeed, this field has been 
thoroughly plowed by scholars following the start of the Iraq 
war, with many concluding that Article 51 never provided a 
viable legal basis for war.109  It is, however, indisputable that 
the United States did perceive a self-defense necessity for 
military action, and that some scholars endorsed the assertion 
of this right and the expanded interpretation of ―imminent 
threat‖ inherent in this invocation.110  What is far more 
 
106. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 212 (―The Security Council is 
the sole international organ mentioned in Article 51.  Nevertheless . . . the 
legitimacy of recourse to self-defence may also be explored—in appropriate 
circumstances—by the International Court of Justice. . . . The Court [has held 
that] because self-defence is a right, it has legal dimensions and judicial 
proceedings [that] are not foreclosed in consequence of the authority of the 
Council.‖). 
107. Id. at 182 (arguing that a ―mere threat‖ does not justify a state‘s 
use of force). 
108. See Letter from the Permanent Representative, supra note 51. 
109. See generally, e.g., Glennon, supra note 59; Schmitt, supra note 68; 
Stahn, supra note 95. 
110. See Christian Henderson, The Bush Doctrine: From Theory to 
Practice, 9 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 3, 16, 24 (2004) (stating that unilateral 
preemption by the United States against Iraq was unwarranted but with 
appropriate Security Council resolutions the doctrine could be legitimately 
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significant for this analysis is the decision of the United States 
not to rely primarily on Article 51 as a right of action.  Because 
the primary basis ultimately relied on by the United States—
that the military action was authorized by Resolutions 678 and 
687—was itself of questionable legitimacy, the important 
question of whether approaching the legality and legitimacy 
challenge from the alternate direction of self-defense would 
have provided a more effective policy posture for the United 
States is raised.111  Certainly the same factors that the United 
 
used in the future); Charles Pierson, Preemptive Self-Defense in an Age of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Operation Iraqi Freedom, 33 DEN. J. INT‘L L. & 
POL‘Y 150, 174 (2004); Adam Tait, The Legal War: A Justification For 
Military Action in Iraq, 9 GONZ. J. INT‘L L. 96 (2005); John Yoo, International 
Law and the War in Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT‘L L. 563, 574–75 (2003). 
111. The potential negative impact such an assertion might have had on 
the creation of the ―coalition of the willing‖ is beyond the scope of this Article.  
However, it is certainly plausible that nations inclined to join the United 
States in the effort to effect regime change in Iraq would find a self-defense 
based theory of legality an unacceptably expansive view of the Charter 
paradigm, which would undermine their willingness to provide support.  This 
perception has been summarized by one author as follows: 
 
It cannot be said that the law has evolved to the point of 
allowing for the use of force in the absence of Security 
Council authorization.  Such evolution would stand the 
Charter system on its head by placing the burden of 
terminating such action on the Council, while permitting 
any permanent member to prevent the Council from 
interfering. 
 
Stahn, supra note 95, at 812 (internal citations omitted).  There is no doubt 
that the United States could have used its veto power to ensure that the 
Security Council did not take action to halt a military operation justified on 
the grounds of self-defense.  However, the dialogue and debate that might 
have surrounded such an effort by opponents of the conflict, while not 
binding, would have had a significant impact on the perceived legitimacy of 
the United States‘ claim.  Thus, had the United States and the United 
Kingdom confronted near unanimous opposition from the Security Council, 
and been forced to employ the veto to defeat a resolution demanding 
termination of military operations, the legitimacy of the action would have 
been severely undermined.  However, substantial division among the 
members of the Security Council, with opponents of the military action 
unable to garner near unanimous support for their efforts to demand 
termination of the action—an equally plausible scenario—would have greatly 
enhanced the credibility of the United States‘ assertions.  Indeed, even Stahn 
acknowledges that the diplomatic interaction that takes place at the Security 
Council in relation to use of force decisions, even when states act on their own 
initiative, plays an important role in determining the ultimate legitimacy of a 
use of force action: 
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States relied upon in its attempt to persuade the Security 
Council that military action was not only necessary and 
justified, but also could not be delayed, would have supported 
such a theory.  The focus of debate would have therefore been 
narrowed to one issue: the meaning of ―imminent‖ threat. 
Even a cursory review of practice and scholarship related 
to the Article 51 right of self-defense indicates that the concept 
of an imminent threat has traditionally been confined to acts 
against an enemy who is about to launch an attack—not one 
that is merely in the preparatory stages of such an attack.112  
The line between these two markers has never been conclusive, 
and there has always been a tension between the need of states 
to protect their territories and populations, and the risk of 
acting prematurely with the consequence of initiating a conflict 
that might have been avoided.  The Six-Day War of 1967 
provides a classic example of the diplomatic risk associated 
with a national judgment that a threat has attained a level of 
imminence justifying the exercise of self-defense.  That war 
began when Israel launched a pre-emptive strike on a number 
of Arab states which Israel determined were massed and poised 
to launch an imminent strike.  The decision to initiate 
hostilities was the result of Israel‘s determination that an Arab 
attack was inevitable, and that waiting for an actual initiation 
of hostilities by the Arab states would produce a strategic 
catastrophe, endangering Israel‘s very existence.113  Therefore, 
Israel launched the attack that resulted in a resounding 
victory, and asserted the inherent right of self-defense as the 
legal basis for its action.  However, even in the face of 
compelling evidence supporting the Israeli judgment of 
 
 
But this evolution has initiated a departure from the formal 
framework of the Charter by transforming the Council de 
facto from an executive authority presiding over 
authorization of the use of force to an arbiter of the 
lawfulness of nonauthorized action that uses various 
techniques of explicit or implicit post hoc endorsement to 
assess the consequences of its own displacement. 
 
Id. 
112. See generally U.N. Comm. on the High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges & Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, U.N. 
Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004). 
113. See SHLAIM, supra note 1, at 242. 
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imminence and the potential consequences of inaction, many 
states condemned Israel for an unjustified invocation of self-
defense that produced an act of aggression.114 
What is the lesson to be drawn from Israel‘s experience?  
One apparent consequence was Israel‘s reluctance to follow the 
same path six years later when Arab forces were again massing 
in opposition.  That decision is viewed by some historians as 
producing the greatest threat to Israel in its history: the Yom 
Kippur War.115  Whether Israel was right in the first instance 
and wrong in the second, or vice versa, is not critically relevant 
for this discussion.  What is relevant is the reality that any 
invocation of the inherent right of self-defense in response to a 
threat, short of an actual armed attack, involves an inherent 
diplomatic and informational risk of condemnation by the 
Security Council.  Thus, once a state determines that use of 
force is necessary to achieve a vital national security interest, 
risk of perceived international illegality is inherent in either 
the collective security process or in the assertion of the right of 
self-defense.  The ultimate difference between these two 
courses of action is the potential impact of the pragmatic 
information burden of persuasion. 
The juxtaposed examples of the Six-Day War and the Yom 
Kippur War provide an instructive illustration of this dynamic.  
In attempting to achieve the perception of legitimacy by acting 
clearly within the collective security paradigm, Israel assumed 
tremendous strategic risk in 1973 by foregoing the benefits of 
preemption against its Arab enemies.  This was motivated in 
large measure by the consequences of that same operational 
strategy six years earlier.  But did Israel gain any meaningful 
advantage by accepting this risk?  Some might debate this 
point, but it seems difficult to ignore the historical record: 
Israel‘s effort to avoid the international approbation triggered 
by its pre-emptive strike in 1967 almost produced a strategic 
catastrophe, but reaped virtually no informational benefits.116  
 
114. See id. at 241-42.  See also DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 192 
(responding to the view that Israel‘s use of force was unjustified and pointing 
out that Israel ―reasonably interpreted‖ and acted upon the information 
available at the time). 
115. See SHLAIM, supra note 1, at 321 (noting that Israel suffered 2,838 
deaths and 8,800 injuries and lost 103 aircraft and 840 tanks in the Yom 
Kippur War). 
116. See id. at 319 (discussing the faulty assumptions made by Israel in 
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As in 1967, Israel stood alone operationally during the conflict, 
and could rely upon only the United States to provide the 
critical support necessary to prevail.  In fact, it was only when 
it became clear that Israeli forces had withstood the initial 
Arab onslaught and were poised to make substantial strategic 
gains against Egypt and Syria that the Security Council 
process became somewhat effective.117 
Since 1973, whenever Israel has chosen to act militarily 
against a perceived threat, it has done so through an assertion 
of its inherent right of self-defense.  These assertions are often 
met with criticism.118  However, this pattern of behavior 
suggests that the lesson learned by Israel, as a result of the 
Six-Day War—Yom Kippur War dichotomy, was that criticism 
is virtually guaranteed whenever military force is used against 
a threat, irrespective of the asserted legal basis.  Invoking the 
inherent right of self-defense, therefore, not only preserves the 
sovereign‘s prerogative to decide when military action should 
be initiated, but it also places the burden of proving illegality 
on Israel‘s opponents.  More importantly, short of a Security 
Council resolution condemning such an invocation and 
requiring a termination of hostilities, debate over the 
legitimacy of the invocation remains just that: debate. 
Within this broader context, the diplomatic strategy 
adopted vis-a-vis Operation Iraqi Freedom seems more suspect.  
It certainly raises the question of whether nations, like the 
United States, have a not-so-subtle incentive to press for 
expansion of the historically uncertain limits of the concept of 
an imminent threat as a valid justification for an action in self-
defense.  In this regard, the nature of the threat faced by a 
state, and perhaps more importantly, the anticipated 
consequences of complying with a narrow definition of 
imminence, seem to be valid considerations in the 
interpretation and implementation of this right.  Even former 
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan implicitly acknowledged 
 
its decision to refrain from attacking and the general intelligence failure of 
the Israel Defense Force). 
117. See id. at 321-22. 
118. See DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 230 (―No country in the world seems 
to have adhered more consistently to a policy of defensive armed reprisals 
than the State of Israel.  For those who negate the entire concept of defensive 
armed reprisals under the Charter, all acts labelled [sic] as such are lumped 
together in one mass of illegality.‖). 
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the necessity of ensuring that the definition of an imminent 
threat matches the realities of the contemporary strategic 
environment.  In an article that discussed the future of the 
United Nations, Annan stated: ―[T]oday we also face dangers 
that are not imminent but that could materialize with little or 
no warning and might culminate in nightmare scenarios if left 
unaddressed.‖119  With regard to Iraq, such a contextual 
definition of imminence should have allowed consideration of 
the potentially catastrophic consequences of delaying military 
action, the potential for Iraq to continue its efforts to acquire or 
produce WMD, and the potential transfer of those weapons to 
terrorist enemies of the United States.  In short, from the 
perspective of a state determined to exercise its inherent right 
to defend itself, at what point does such a threat become 
imminent? 
This theory was in fact central to the United States in its 
National Security Strategy of 2002.120  According to that 
document: 
 
We must adapt the concept of imminent 
threat to the capabilities and objectives of today‘s 
adversaries.  Rogue states and terrorists do not 
seek to attack using conventional means.  They 
know such attacks would fail.  Instead, they rely 
on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of 
weapons of mass destruction—weapons that can 
be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used 
without warning.121 
 
This strategy statement indicates the perceived necessity 
on the part of the United States to ensure that the concept of 
an imminent threat, as related to the exercise of the right of 
self-defense, evolves to effectively address emerging 
 
119. Kofi Annan, “In Larger Freedom”: Decision Time at the U.N., 84 
FOREIGN AFF., May-June 2005, at 63, 69. 
120. See generally NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM 
(2003), available at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-
terrorism/Counter_Terrorism_Strategy.pdf; PETER PACE, CHAIRMAN OF THE 
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY TO COMBAT WEAPONS OF 
MASS DESTRUCTION (2002), available at www.defenselink.mil/pdf/NMS-
CWMD2006.pdf; THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 82. 
121. THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 82, at 15. 
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transnational terrorist threats.  In fact, this evolution is 
reflected in the joint resolution passed by Congress in 2002, 
which authorized the use of military force against Iraq, and 
that, in addition to citing Resolution 678 as a legal basis for 
military action, also included the following provision: 
 
Whereas Iraq‘s demonstrated capability and 
willingness to use weapons of mass destruction, 
the risk that the current Iraqi regime will either 
employ those weapons to launch a surprise 
attack against the United States or its Armed 
Forces or provide them to international terrorists 
who would do so, and the extreme magnitude of 
harm that would result to the United States and 
its citizens from such an attack, combine to 
justify action by the United States to defend 
itself . . .122 
 
In retrospect, the failure to validate the asserted presence 
of WMD renders it tempting to conclude that no valid basis 
existed for the United States to assert an inherent right of self-
defense as its justification for military action against Iraq.  
However, this alternate theory must be critiqued 
prospectively—not retrospectively.  At the time the United 
States decided to initiate military action, the perceived 
imminence of the threat posed by Iraq clearly motivated that 
decision.  In fact, the perception of ―imminence‖ seems to have 
been corroborated by the United States‘s unwillingness to 
acquiesce to suggestions that the requested Security Council 
action be postponed in order to provide additional time for the 
inspection process. 
What if the United States had adopted the same approach 
that Israel adopted in 1967—namely, to unequivocally assert 
that it intended to act against Iraq pursuant to its inherent 
right of self-defense?  Such an assertion would have no doubt 
generated opposition from members of the international 
community.  However, unlike the course of action adopted by 
the United States, this approach would have placed the burden 
 
122. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498, 1499 (2002). 
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of ―proving‖ illegality onto the opponents of the military action, 
and would have allowed the United States to defend a theory, 
rather than to obtain a consensus. 
In this regard, it is once again instructive to consider the 
construction of Article 51.  As previously noted, Article 51 
acknowledges the sovereign prerogative of member states to 
make judgments as to when action in individual or collective 
self-defense is necessary.  However, the article also apparently 
acknowledges that this prerogative is subject to abuse.  It 
therefore provides that member states must report to the 
Security Council any action taken pursuant to such an 
assertion of authority.  Furthermore, it provides that the 
Security Council may, in a sense, ―assume‖ responsibility for 
the situation that resulted in the purported self-defense action.  
These aspects of Article 51, when read in conjunction with 
Articles 39, 41, and 42, provide a mechanism to check the 
abusive or unjustified exercise of the right of self-defense. 
As a result, reliance by the United States on Article 51 as a 
legal basis for the initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom would 
have led to two immediate consequences.  First, it would have 
focused the debate on one clear issue: the meaning of imminent 
threat.  This focus could have conceivably accrued to the 
benefit of the United States and other allies who supported 
military action.  The litany of evidence indicating Iraqi non-
compliance with international legal obligations would have 
supported the assertion that Iraq must be regarded as 
unpredictable.  Of course, critics of the United States‘s position 
would have undoubtedly pointed to the years of containment as 
evidence that Iraq did not pose a genuine threat to the United 
States.  However, the new element of a transnational terrorist 
group with an avowed determination to conduct mass casualty 
attacks against the United States and other coalition partners, 
and with a demonstrated ability to do so, could have been cited 
as a factor that rendered the past evidence relatively 
insignificant to the imminent threat equation.  Furthermore, 
the United States would have been in the position to proffer the 
anticipated devastating consequences of ―getting it wrong,‖ and 
opponents would have been forced to call into question the 
apparent legitimate U.S. interest of protecting its territory and 
population.  The fact that the United States had actually been 
the victim of ―getting it wrong‖ on 9/11 would have no doubt 
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enhanced the credibility of such a position. 
The second immediate impact would have been that 
opponents of the United States‘s assertion of a self-defense 
justification would have carried a practical burden of building a 
consensus of opposition.  They would likely have initiated this 
effort by arguing that, absent an actual attack by Iraq, military 
action by the United States without express Security Council 
authorization should be presumed illegal, and that the United 
States bore the burden of establishing otherwise.  From a pure 
international law standpoint, this argument may indeed be 
perfectly legitimate.  However, at a practical informational and 
diplomatic level, the challenge for opponents to military action 
would have been more complex.  These opponents would have 
confronted the same reality that disabled the U.S. effort to 
build consensus around authorizing military action: securing 
such consensus is no easy task among the community of 
nations, and it is certainly a significant burden for the Security 
Council.  The United States could have asserted full 
compliance with Article 51 by reporting the proposed action to 
the Security Council.  Doing so would have then have imposed 
a burden on its opponents to establish their own consensus at 
the Security Council to oppose the United States‘s invocation of 
its right to defend itself. 
It is of course axiomatic that the veto powers of the United 
States and the United Kingdom would have ensured that no 
resolution in opposition to the U.S. position could have 
prevailed.  However, the United States and its partners could 
have allowed the process to run its course.  This would have 
forced opponents at the Security Council to do more than 
threaten a veto of a use-of-force resolution—it would have 
forced the opponents to actually table a resolution challenging 
the validity of the United States‘s judgment as to the nature of 
this emerging threat, and to then generate enough support for 
that resolution to make the United States‘s use of its veto 
power appear wholly invalid.  Whether Security Council 
opponents to military action could have mustered the national 
will necessary to take such an action is highly questionable. 
Even assuming such a resolution was proposed, it is highly 
unlikely that it would have received anything close to 
unanimous support.  Instead, it is probable that the vote would 
have been extremely divided.  Thus, instead of providing 
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opponents to military action the opportunity to defeat the U.S. 
policy with one vote, the United States would have been able to 
assert that a divided vote in opposition to its interpretation of 
the right of self-defense fell far short of a conclusive rejection of 
that determination.  This process would have had the 
additional benefit of allowing the United States to legitimately 
assert that military action was conducted consistently with the 
use-of-force paradigm reflected in the U.N. Charter, and 
thereby undermine the credibility of any accusation that the 
United States was dismissing the value of that paradigm.  This 
process would have also enabled the United States to assert 
that it had validated the role of the Security Council as a check 
on the exercise of self-defense, which would have offset any 
assertion that the United States had set into motion a process 
whereby states would routinely rely upon Article 51 as a 
subterfuge for engaging in military aggression. 
It seems clear that the United States made a reasoned 
decision not to rely exclusively upon an assertion of the right of 
self-defense as a basis for military action against Iraq.  Why 
this was the case is a matter of speculation, but likely reasons 
included the potential resistance by other members of the 
―coalition of the willing,‖ or the concern that establishing a self-
defense precedent might be abused by other states in the 
future.  It is just as likely, however, that the legal course of 
action selected was the result of hubris on the part of the Bush 
Administration, confident that it would prevail with its burden 
of persuading other members of the Security Council that a 
new authorization for military action against Iraq was 
necessary, and that it must accommodate the U.S. military 
timetable.  Of course, ―hindsight is 20/20,‖ but it is clear that 
whatever the motive for selecting the new authorization 
approach, the United States failed to establish a credible legal 
basis for the military action.  Perhaps even more troubling, 
accepting the burden of persuasion, and subsequently failing to 
meet that burden, forced the United States to publicly condemn 
the efficacy of the U.N. collective security process—a 
cornerstone of post-Cold War U.S. strategic policy. 
Considering the loss of international credibility suffered by 
the United States as a result of being perceived as dismissive of 
international law, the damage to the credibility of the U.N. 
collective security system, and the political consequence 
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confronted by those states determined to stand beside the 
United States in its effort to force regime change in Iraq, it is 
difficult to conclude that a self-defense-based approach to the 
use-of-force decision vis-a-vis Iraq would have been 
substantially riskier.  Might this approach have provided 
traditional allies struggling to justify the instinct to support 
the United States a more viable basis to make that leap of 
faith? 
This question appears to be taking on renewed relevance 
as the United States and other like-minded countries confront 
the reality of an increasingly belligerent North Korea who is 
poised to possess nuclear weapons with long-range delivery 
capability.  In light of the fact that President Obama has 
already announced that North Korea cannot be allowed to 
possess such a capability, the possibility that the United States 
will decide to launch a military strike against North Korea is 
far from speculation.  Like President Bush in 2002, if President 
Obama reaches this decision point, he will be forced to confront 
a diplomatic reality: the issue of North Korean proliferation 
has been within the purview of the Security Council for more 
than a decade, in large measure due to the insistence of the 
United States.  Will this functionally lock the United States 
into a collective security authorization legal strategy?  If it 
does, what will be the consequence of failing to prevail in 
persuading other Security Council members of the need for 
such an authorization?  Perhaps more importantly, do the 
diplomatic and information risks associated with that course of 
action—risks that were validated by the United States‘s 
experience with Operation Iraqi Freedom—create an incentive 
for the United States to bypass that process altogether and to 
take its proverbial chances by invoking a right of action 
pursuant to Article 51?  The answer to this question should, 
and almost inevitably will, depend in large measure on the 
intelligence preparation of the diplomatic battlefield, and the 
potential payoff that such an approach would hold for 
developing a perception of international credibility.  It is to this 
issue that the Article will now turn. 
 
42http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/18
526 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:2 
V.  The Enhanced ―Supportability‖ of the  
Self-Defense Theory of Action 
 
While reluctance and resistance to the U.S. effort to 
generate support for Operation Iraqi Freedom existed in 
various degrees throughout the globe, Europe clearly 
dominated the limelight as the primary obstructer of the 
effort.123  The relatively strong influence that Europe has on 
world politics and its tradition of cooperation with the United 
States in international conflicts explains why it was so 
influential on the overall perception of legitimacy for ousting 
Saddam Hussein from power.  The apparent ultimate rejection 
of that process, with the accordant emphasis of the ―coalition of 
the willing,‖ is an example of the consequence of being 
perceived as operating outside the accepted norms of 
international law in relation to the use of force.  This section 
considers the impact that a self-defense based theory of legality 
might have had on the ―supportability‖ of the conflict by other 
states.  This consideration is important not only to suggest that 
such a theory might have proven more effective from an 
international political standpoint, but also because it reflects a 
potential benefit of reliance on this theory in future military 
actions in support of national security objectives.  A discussion 
on how European states and key institutions may have 
perceived and responded to this alternative approach does not 
lend itself to a precise and distinct account, as there are far too 
many plausible outcomes.  Instead, the complexities associated 
with each nation and organization‘s unique policies and 
decision-making processes suggest a broad alternative 
discussion.  Hence, the value of this discourse is to identify 
arguments that indicate a shift in support of the United States 
with reference to the course of action it pursued together with 
its coalition partners. 
During a 2005 visit to Europe, President Bush called for 
unity in support of the emerging democracy in Iraq.124  This 
call was a response to the reality that, more than two years 
 
123. See Stahn, supra note 95, at 806 n.10 (citing numerous legal 
journals and news reports reflecting European opposition to the United 
States‘s policy). 
124. See Michael A. Fletcher & Keith B. Richburg, Bush Seeks to Mend 
Transatlantic Rift, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2005, at A1. 
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after the initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the rift 
between the United States and many of its traditional 
European partners continued to impact transatlantic relations.  
While European leaders applauded the elections in Iraq and 
the efforts of the people of that country to establish a 
democratic state,125 there remained a general unwillingness on 
their part to retroactively endorse the legal theory proffered by 
the United States to justify the conflict.  A significant issue 
related to the development of this rift involved differences over 
the international legal authority for the initiation of the 
conflict.126 
In retrospect it is clear that the United States 
underestimated the persuasion required to muster sufficient 
European support.  Still, the Bush Administration was 
cognizant of such challenges and of the need to produce 
arguments that appealed to the other side of the Atlantic.  
When confronted by European media during the run-up to the 
Iraq War, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld elaborated on 
the importance of persuasion of European allies based on his 
experience as Ambassador to NATO: 
 
[W]hen we would go in and make a proposal, 
there wouldn‘t be unanimity.  There wouldn‘t 
even be understanding.  And we‘d have to be 
persuasive.  We‘d have to show reasons.  We‘d 
have to—have to give rationales.  We‘d have to 
show facts.  And, by golly, I found that Europe on 
any major issue is given—if there‘s leadership 
and if you‘re right, and if your facts are 
persuasive, Europe responds.  And they always 
have.127 
 
125. See World Leaders Praise Iraq Elections, USATODAY.COM, Jan. 31, 
2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2005-01-31-iraq-world-
reax_x.htm. 
126. See generally Philip H. Gordon, Iraq: The Transatlantic Debate, 39 
EUROPEAN UNION INST. FOR SECURITY STUDIES OCCASIONAL PAPERS 1 (2002), 
available at http://www.iss.europa.eu/nc/actualites/actualite/article/iraq-the-
transatlantic-
debate/philip%20h.%20gordon/?tx_ttnews[cboAuteurs]=ALL&tx_ttnews[chkA
rea][0]=allarea&tx_ttnews[chkType][0]=22&tx_ttnews[cboMois]=10&tx_ttne
ws[cboAn]=1990&cHash=c18c0920d9. 
127. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Briefs at the Foreign Press 
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Later during the address Rumsfeld coined the delineation 
between the ―old‖ and the ―new‖ Europe, which raised strong 
reactions on the other side of the Atlantic, and which would 
become an obstacle in itself toward reaching transatlantic 
consensus.128  Notwithstanding this simplistic division of 
Europe, there was a clear split amongst European states.  The 
United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Poland and many small 
countries sided with the United States, while the ardent 
opposition was spearheaded by France and Germany, and 
supported by Greece, Belgium and other small countries.129 
Whenever a state adopts a theory of legality for the use of 
force, it must consider the consequences that policy will have 
on the state‘s relations with other members of the community 
of nations.  For a state committed to emphasizing its 
commitment to the rule of law in the international 
community—like the United States—this consideration is an 
essential component of the national security decision-making 
process related to the use of force.  To this end, the United 
States, as the only superpower, had a unique ability to leverage 
its position.  When powerful states invite weaker states to join 
their position, a strategic calculus takes place as to whether 
the cost of opposing the stronger state is greater than the gain 
of joining it.  Whether the motive for not supporting the U.S.-
led endeavor involved a lack of widespread public support, 
unsubstantiated intelligence, economic interests, domestic 
politics, or a reliance on U.N. inspectors, governments 
invariably also considered the self-evident benefits of standing 
alongside the United States.  There was also a potential 
domestic and international political payoff inherent in 
participating in the creation of a new era for the Iraqi people—
an aspect of Operation Iraqi Freedom consistent with the 
 
Center (Jan. 22, 2003), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1330. 
128. See Outrage at “Old Europe” Remarks, BBCNEWS.COM, Jan. 23, 
2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2687403.stm. 
129. See Jürgen Schuster & Herbert Maier, The Rift: Explaining 
Europe‟s Divergent Iraq Policies in the Run-Up of the American-Led War on 
Iraq, 2 FOREIGN POL‘Y ANALYSIS 229, 238 (2006).  See also Greece Plans Iraq 
Emergency Summit, BBCNEWS.COM, Feb. 10, 2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2744375.stm (follow ―Clickable Map‖ link 
located within the article‘s text). 
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traditional European commitment of respect for human rights.  
The result of these competing interests was an obvious 
dilemma confronted by most European governments when they 
deliberated whether to support, oppose, or remain neutral vis-
a-vis the inevitable conflict.  Notably, while joining the 
stronger state—a phenomenon referred to in political science as 
―Bandwagoning‖130—often provides a compelling option, it also 
necessitates the offering of incentives, something that many 
Europeans would argue were in short supply during the run-up 
to the Iraqi intervention.   
Research suggests that while traditional power politics ran 
its course in the East, Western Europe revealed another 
dynamic that required a different incentive.  Their divide ran 
alongside the political orientations of governments, with liberal 
ideologies overrepresented in opposition of the United States.131  
For these liberal states, the idea of lending active support to a 
military endeavor in Iraq became an insurmountable cost to 
bear under the circumstances.  A military campaign would not 
only have terminated the United Nations‘s most tangible effort 
to resolve the situation—its Monitoring, Verification, and 
Inspection Commission (―UNMOVIC‖)132—it also suggested 
that all of the other options at the disposal of the international 
community were exhausted.  When the head of UNMOVIC, 
Hans Blix, and others continued their advocacy for prolonged 
inspections, new benchmarks, and revised timelines, the 
domestic burden of proof for those liberal leaders deliberating 
national costs easily tilted to the benefit of the politically safe 
option—despite the perceived threat posed by Saddam 
Hussein.  Indeed, it became impossible to erect sufficient 
support for a military operation based on collective security 
theory.  Moreover, the collective security approach allowed 
those in opposition to effectively seize the moral high ground at 
the expense of the United States and its allies.  While reliance 
on a self-defense theory of legality would have certainly 
 
130. The competing option for Bandwagoning is balance of power.  For a 
discussion on the subject, see generally STEPHEN WALT, THE ORIGINS OF 
ALLIANCES (1987). 
131. See generally Schuster & Maier, supra note 129, at 233. 
132. UNMOVIC was created by the U.N. Security Council, see S.C. Res. 
1284, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1284 (Dec. 17, 1999) (establishing UNMOVIC as a 
subsidiary body of the Council and replacing the Special Commission that 
had been established by S.C. Res. 687).  See also infra note 164. 
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generated international opposition, it is interesting to consider 
whether this ―shifted-burden‖ approach might have offered 
liberal governments seeking a rational basis to support the 
United States a more viable basis to do so.  Arguably, a U.S. 
narrative with a legal basis rooted in self-defense would not 
have changed the European reluctance towards a military 
invasion, but it may have significantly relaxed the 
requirements of political commitment, as it would not have 
required unequivocal support for the United States and its 
partners.  In fact, this option could have allowed European 
politicians to voice mild concerns about a forthcoming invasion 
to satisfy their domestic audience, without challenging the 
United States‘s inherent right of self-defense.  This is not to say 
that all Europeans would have sided with the United States, 
but it would have lowered the threshold for those whose 
political calculus included more than one plausible outcome.  A 
self-defense justification would also have avoided the 
perception that the United States held a confrontational 
posture toward the United Nations, an organization cherished 
by so many Europeans.133 
To further unpack the European resistance, it is helpful to 
examine the competing option to Bandwagoning: balance of 
power.  Put simply, the United States wanted the United 
Nations to relinquish the international community‘s authority 
to deal with the situation with few, if any, incentives with 
regards to power and control.  With this view, Rumsfeld‘s 
miscalculation of ―old Europe‖ as irrelevant becomes apparent.  
In 2003, five of the fifteen members of the U.N. Security 
Council were European.  In addition to the permanent 
members, France, the United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Germany, 
and Spain each had seats at the table.134  It is not surprising 
that the most vocal resistance came from some of the members 
 
133. The Treaty on the European Union (―TEU‖), entered into force in 
1993, includes a definition of foreign policy objectives that put emphasis on 
the role of the United Nations and the U.N. Charter: ―[T]o safeguard the 
common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the 
Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter . . . to 
preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the 
principles of the United Nations Charter . . . .‖  E.U. Charter art. 11.1. 
134. Press Release, Membership of Principal United Nations Organs in 
2003, U.N. Doc. ORG/1371 (Oct. 1, 2003), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/org1371.doc.htm. 
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of this group.  Even Tony Blair, an early proponent of taking 
military action, was adamant on his preference for 
authorization through the United Nations.  Europeans saw 
little benefit in surrendering control of the situation through 
their representatives in the Security Council.  This perception 
was manifested in a European Union Council Declaration in 
the midst of transatlantic consultations, which emphasized 
that those nations were ―committed to the United Nations 
remaining at the centre of the international order.‖135 
By pursuing collective security as its legal basis, the 
United States forced many European states to choose between 
two incompatible options: the safe option of continued political 
relevance and influence over the process through the United 
Nations, and indirectly through the European Union; or the 
risky option of taking a stand for a U.S.-led intervention and 
implicitly sharing the burden of risk while surrendering the 
ability to influence the process following a Security Council 
decision supporting collective security.  Since many of these 
states were regarded as ―old Europe,‖ any hopes of recognition 
and relevance in future transatlantic relations were 
understandably modest.  Had a Security Council-endorsed 
invasion failed in some way—for example, by a failure to find 
or take possession of Iraqi WMD—the Security Council 
decision and its supporters would almost certainly be 
scrutinized and subjected to harsh criticism.  Hence, given the 
circumstances, it can be argued that the United States had 
asked for a lot, particularly since President Bush had claimed 
that the international community was risk-adverse on this 
issue.136  Advancing inherent self-defense as its legal basis 
would not have called for a U.N. Security Council ruling.  
Instead, counter to the propositions related to balance-of-
power, this could have given members of the United Nations 
 
135. See Extraordinary European Council at Brussels Presidency 
Conclusions (EC) No. 6466/03 of 17 Feb. 2003, at 1, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/7455
4.pdf. 
136. Specifically, President Bush said that ―[i]t is important to know 
that the Iraq is an extension of the war on terror. . . . The international 
community is risk adverse.  But I assure you I am going to stay plenty 
tough.‖  SCOTT MCCLELLAN, WHAT HAPPENED: INSIDE THE BUSH WHITE HOUSE 
AND WASHINGTON‘S CULTURE OF DECEPTION 139 (2008) (quoting President 
George W. Bush, Address to Republican Governors (Sept. 20, 2002)). 
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and the rest of the international community a comfortable 
position as ―bystanders,‖ who could form and articulate their 
view at the time of their convenience, without bearing any of 
the political risks or responsibilities, and, at the same time, 
without the ability to influence the process.  In the case of 
France, it is unlikely that it would have been attracted by 
being sidelined.  President Jacques Chirac‘s clear ‗non‘137 to a 
military intervention, as reflected in French media on March 
11, 2003, at the pinnacle of the diplomatic quarrel, came as no 
surprise.  It was consistent with the policy he had articulated 
six months earlier in an interview with the New York Times.138  
Neither was his position unavoidable.  Despite the rhetoric, 
France was considering, and possibly preparing for, military 
options.139  The French policy was premised by two key 
propositions: a rejection of unilateralism and an absence of a 
clear and present danger.  Both propositions enjoyed broad 
appeal in Europe.  A self-defense approach would have taken 
the edge off of the latter argument, since it narrowed the scope 
to threats against the United States and avoided competing 
with European threat perceptions.  Hence, drawing upon the 
provisions of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and self-defense as 
a legal basis might have provided a more viable basis for 
European governments to leverage support in favor of taking 
action in line with U.S. plans.  Consequently, an approach 
based on Article 51 rests on the assumption that the United 
States would have been able to gain more support, or at least 
at a minimum, less resistance, for the action the United States 
deemed necessary to counter the threat that Iraq posed. 
The first French proposition, unilateralism, encapsulated 
the depth of the Euro-American divide in that the countries did 
not share a common view of the world or the utility of power.  
American foreign policy commentator Robert Kagan argues 
that, while Europe has entered a post-historical paradise of 
peace and relative prosperity, the United States remains 
anchored in history, where military power still has an essential 
 
137. See Quelles Que Soient Les Circonstances, la France Votera Non, 
supra note 104. 
138. See French Leader Offers America Both Friendship and Criticism, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2002, at A9. 
139. See David Styan, Jacques Chirac‟s „Non‟: France, Iraq and the 
United Nations, 1991-2003, 12 MOD. & CONTEMP. FR. 371, 380-81 (2004). 
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role to play.140  The senior European Union (―E.U.‖) diplomat 
Robert Cooper offers another discourse as he postulates that 
Europe is a ―postmodern‖ continent that has moved beyond the 
balance-of-power system towards co-existence and 
cooperation.141  This system has elevated the application of 
international law to a level close to that of national law.  In this 
context, the U.N. Charter stands as the chief guardian against 
unilateral and unlawful actions against international peace 
and security.  Consistent with this view is the European 
Parliament‘s nonbinding resolution passed in January 2003, 
which rejected a unilateral U.S.-led military intervention 
against Iraq: ―[A] pre-emptive strike would not be in 
accordance with international law and the UN Charter and 
would lead to a deeper crisis involving other countries in the 
region . . .‖142 
The selection of legal theory for the conflict becomes 
critical.  Regardless of the official theory ultimately endorsed 
by the United States, the reversion to reliance on Resolution 
678 at a late stage created a powerful perception that the 
United States had in fact rejected the collective security 
mechanism of the United Nations.  As a result some 
governments were constrained, not only by policy concerns, but 
also by national laws prohibiting support for Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, as the result of this apparent deviation from the 
accepted legal framework.  In fairness, the European states are 
neither a homogeneous group, nor entrenched in their 
positions.  For example, despite its commitment to 
international law, Europe allowed itself to bend its principles 
during the Kosovo campaign against Serbia.143  Not only was 
this operation employed by the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (―NATO‖), but it was supported by the European 
 
140. See generally ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA VS. 
EUROPE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER (2003). 
141. See generally ROBERT COOPER, THE BREAKING OF NATIONS: ORDER 
AND CHAOS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2004). 
142. See European Parliament Resolution on the Situation in Iraq, EUR. 
PARL. DOC. P5_TA 0032 (2003), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/committees/afet/20040405/p5_ta(200
3)0032_en.pdf. 
143. See Dino Kritsiotis, The Kosovo Crisis and Nato‟s Application of 
Armed Force Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 49 INT‘L & COMP. 
L.Q. 330, 340 (2000).  See also supra note 133. 
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Union, despite the lack of U.N. Security Council authorization.  
The European Council Declaration that offered support to the 
intervention did so from a self-defense, humanitarian and 
historical perspective.144  Indeed mindful of its history, the 
notion of self-defense resonates in Europe. 
As the Iraqi crisis emerged, the communicated rationale 
for taking military action revolved around three areas: Saddam 
Hussein‘s oppression of the Iraqi people, Iraq‘s possession of 
WMD and its willingness to use them, and the risk of Saddam 
Hussein rendering aid and protection to transnational terrorist 
organizations, including members of Al Qaeda.  These two 
latter considerations would have formed the basis for an 
assertion of self-defense authority individually, and even more 
so, when combined.  As discussed above, they provided the core 
of the joint resolution passed by Congress in 2002 authorizing 
the use of military force against Iraq.145  The underpinnings 
were not unsupported in Europe, at least on a principal level.  
In the aftermath of the Iraqi rift, the Europeans crafted their 
first Security Strategy in an effort to demonstrate unity.146  
Despite the apparent fundamental differences between the 
 
144. See European Council at Berlin Presidency Conclusions (EC) No. 
SN 100/99, at 30 (1999), available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACF
B2.html.  The Council stated that: 
 
On the threshold of the 21st century, Europe cannot 
tolerate a humanitarian catastrophe in its midst.  It cannot 
be permitted that, in the middle of Europe, the predominant 
population of Kosovo is collectively deprived of its rights and 
subjected to grave human rights abuses.  We, the countries 
of the European Union, are under a moral obligation to 
ensure that indiscriminate behaviour and violence, which 
became tangible in the massacre at Racak in January 1999, 
are not repeated.  We have a duty to ensure the return to 
their homes of the hundreds of thousands of refugees and 
displaced persons.  Aggression must not be rewarded.  An 
aggressor must know that he will have to pay a high price.  
That is the lesson to be learnt from the 20th century. 
 
Id. 
145. It must be emphasized that the validity of the intelligence 
underpinning the United States‘s policy is beyond the scope of this Article, 
and this alternate theory must be critiqued prospectively. 
146. See generally A Secure Europe in a Better World (EC), No. 10881/03 
of June 25, 2003, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf. 
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United States and Europe on power and world order, as 
discussed above, the contrast may in part be a case of prejudice 
in both directions.  Research comparing the American and 
European strategies acknowledges divergence in their 
mindsets.147  However, it concludes that the U.S. agenda was 
guided by idealistic values whereas the European strategy 
appeared more realistic.148  The European strategy document 
reveals common ground that was never seized during 
diplomatic efforts.  Consistent with the United States‘s 
assessment, the European strategy singled out terrorism and 
proliferation of WMD as key threats.149  The strategy also 
supported the notion of exercising self-defense outside its own 
borders, and specifically noted that the first line of defense will 
often be abroad.150 
Despite the disagreement on the pre-emptive doctrine 
employed by the United States, the European view called for 
early, rapid, and, when necessary, robust interventions, as well 
as the importance of being ready to act before a crisis occurs 
(although the latter is not necessarily related to military 
interventions).  While it would be naïve to suggest that these 
differences could have been completely bridged by applying a 
self-defense option, it can be argued that there was potential to 
better leverage the arguments under such a theory. 
Another credible rationale for asserting self-defense as the 
legal basis must take the 9/11 terrorist attacks as a point of 
departure.  Following the attacks, the international community 
extended wide support to the United States, and through the 
adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373,151 initiated 
by France, the United States gained legitimacy to take 
responsive actions.  Moreover, on September 12, 2001, the 
North Atlantic Council (―NAC‖) of NATO decided to invoke 
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty152 for the first time in the 
Alliance‘s history.  Notably, Article 5 makes specific references 
 
147. See Felix Sebastian Berenskoetter, Mapping the Mind Gap: A 
Comparison of US and European Security Strategies, 36 SECURITY DIALOGUE 
71, 89 (2005). 
148. See id. 
149. See A Secure Europe in a Better World, supra note 146. 
150. See id. 
151. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
152. North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 
U.N.T.S. 243. 
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to the right of collective self-defense as laid out in Article 51 of 
the U.N. Charter.153  The seventeen European allies and 
Canada had concluded that the Al Qaeda-sponsored terrorist 
attacks against the United States were considered attacks 
against all of NATO‘s member states.154  However, this 
willingness to provide support based on collective self-defense 
was never leveraged by the Bush Administration.  Instead, the 
Bush Administration employed military power against the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan in a manner that failed to 
exploit the benefits of collective self-defense, and accordingly, 
rejected troop contributions from several traditional NATO 
allies.  Despite the lack of interest in utilizing collective 
measures in accordance with the NATO Treaty and the U.N. 
Charter, the Bush Administration asserted self-defense as the 
legal justification for launching Operation Enduring Freedom.  
Accordingly, a notification was issued to the Security Council 
stating that the United States was acting in self-defense.  
Following the initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom,155 the 
European Union gave its ―staunchest support for the military 
operations‖ and underlined its legitimacy under the U.N. 
Charter.156 
Despite a selective approach in engaging traditional 
European allies and partners, the ad hoc cooperation that 
eventually came to fruition after major combat operations 
ended in Afghanistan was the broadest coalition ever formed.  
However, what the coalition had gained in width, it had lost in 
depth.  The lack of consultation prior to deploying in 
 
153. Id. 
154. Press Release, North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], 
Statement by the North Atlantic Council (Sept. 12, 2001), available at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm. 
155. On October 7, 2001, President Bush announced the launch of 
Operation Enduring Freedom.  George W. Bush, Address to the Nation (Oct. 
7, 2001), http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html.  The 
operation was an integral part of the larger Global War on Terror, with the 
legal basis provided by a Senate Joint Resolution.  See S.J. Res. 23, 107th 
Cong. (2001). 
156. Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of the European 
Union and the President of the Commission, Follow-Up to the September 11 
Attacks and the Fight Against Terrorism (EC) No. SN 4296/2/01 of Oct. 19, 
2001, at 1, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/terrorism/documents/conseil_gand_en.
pdf. 
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Afghanistan and the feeling that they had been marginalized 
became sources of frustration for traditional European allies 
and partners.  Moreover, the initial hardships and successes 
became primarily U.S. and U.K. commodities, and did not 
provide a cohesive bond within the wider community of 
traditional allies and partners.  Instead, a growing rift between 
the United States and several European allies developed and 
the two continents drifted apart in their perceptions on how to 
best address terrorist threats.  This was reflected in a 
statement issued by the European Union in the midst of 
transatlantic consultations indicating that it did not support a 
broad theory of self-defense as a legal basis for more 
widespread military operations related to the Global War on 
Terror.157  Instead it emphasized that ―the United Nations 
remain[s] at the centre of the international order.‖158 
Indeed, the time period between 9/11 and the initiation of 
the United States‘s diplomatic effort to obtain Security Council 
support for Operation Iraqi Freedom represents a missed 
opportunity to build a shared notion of collective self-defense as 
a legal basis for military efforts aimed at defeating terrorism.  
Had the United States exploited the invocation of Article 5 of 
the NATO Treaty in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, 
it would have defined a new formula for collective self-defense 
against terrorism.  Such a modus operandi could have paved 
the way for a similar approach against Saddam Hussein, and 
setting the legal conditions for Operation Iraqi Freedom would 
have formed the next step in this theory of collective defense 
against terrorism. 
At this critical juncture, governments inclined to oppose 
the United States‘s plans to effect regime change in Iraq would 
have borne the burden of articulating the illegality of the self-
defense theory, and as a result, would have found it more 
difficult to convey persuasive arguments against the 
established method of collective self-defense.  Certainly, the 
challenge of convincing additional European states of Saddam 
Hussein‘s links to Al Qaeda would have remained.  However, 
because the burden of proof would have shifted, the United 
States would have been in a stronger political position; once 
 
157. Extraordinary European Council at Brussels Presidency 
Conclusions, supra note 135. 
158. Id. at 1. 
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notice of the theory and evidence in support of the conclusion 
had been published, inaction by other states could have been 
treated as acquiescence to the theory of legality.  In this regard, 
it is significant to consider that at the time the United States 
began to articulate its rationale for Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
no credible evidence that de-linked Saddam Hussein from his 
alleged terrorist affiliations was offered by any state opposing 
the looming conflict.  Furthermore, Resolution 1441, adopted 
unanimously in November 2002, condemned Iraq for its 
continuing ties to terrorism159—a fact that seems relevant in 
support of a self-defense theory of legality. 
These facts, and the shifted burden of persuasion, would 
not have prevented some nations from opposing the United 
States‘s plans.  However, rather than having pressure 
accumulate against the United States as the result of the 
Security Council‘s inaction, that same inaction would have 
shifted attention to those nations detracting from the United 
States‘s theory of legitimacy.  Furthermore, had the United 
States capitalized on its allies‘ invocation of Article 5 of the 
NATO Treaty based on the precedent that might have been 
established in relation to Operation Enduring Freedom, the 
focus of debate could very easily have been shifted to the 
question of whether such invocation was legitimate under the 
circumstances, as opposed to the focus that actually did develop 
at the Security Council. 
European polls conducted in January 2003, before the 
commencement of hostilities, indicated overwhelming public 
opposition throughout Europe—ranging from sixty-eight 
percent to eighty-eight percent—against going to war without 
an additional Security Council Resolution.160  However, the 
opposition to war in the event that a new U.N. resolution was 
agreed upon was considerably lower, ranging from twelve to 
seventy-two percent, with all the E.U. countries at fifty percent 
or below.161  Notably, the opposition in France was less than 
 
159. See generally S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 52. 
160. See William Horsley, Polls Find Europeans Oppose Iraq War, 
BBCNEWS.COM., Feb. 11, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2747175.stm 
(follow ―Graphical Data‖ link located within the article‘s text). 
161. See id. (follow ―Graphical Data‖) (noting that a January 2003 
European Omnibus Survey found that, among European nations, only 
Austria, Finland, and Greece reported resistance levels to a U.N.-mandated 
mission well above fifty percent). 
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thirty percent.162  Yet several leaders—like Tony Blair (United 
Kingdom), Jose Maria Aznar (Spain), and Leszek Miller 
(Poland)—decided to seek their nations‘ support to contribute 
to Operation Iraqi Freedom without a credible U.N. Security 
Council resolution.  It is interesting to note that empirical 
research suggests that public opinion cannot account for the 
path chosen by these governments.163 
Had NATO previously achieved the success associated 
with Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan through the 
collective defense process—as opposed to the ―coalition of the 
willing‖ concept actually relied upon by the United States in 
that conflict—European governments might have been able to 
leverage that example in support of an effort to galvanize 
public support for a similar endeavor in Iraq.  Arguably, 
several traditional European allies and partners had as large a 
problem with the perceived cavalier approach to coalition 
building practiced by the United States in both Afghanistan 
and Iraq as they did with the de facto legal justifications for 
going to war.  The very clear signals from the Bush 
Administration that conflicted to effect regime change in Iraq 
were inevitable, regardless of the opposition from numerous 
traditional supporters of U.S. foreign policy, engendered even 
more entrenched opposition in several European capitals, 
which was exacerbated by the reaction of the media and 
widespread public opposition to the United States. 
Had the United States asserted a self-defense-based 
rationale in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom—with the 
stated objective of removing the Hussein regime because of its 
established record of non-compliance with international legal 
obligations related to WMD and its alleged sponsorship of 
terrorism164—the diplomatic outcome might have been 
 
162. Id. (follow ―Graphical Data‖). 
163. See Schuster & Maier, supra note 129, at 223. 
164. After the Gulf War cease fire, Resolution 687 defined the terms of 
the cease fire and required Iraqi acceptance of those terms.  See S.C. Res. 
687, supra note 49.  The resolution addressed both terrorism and WMD.  Id.  
Moreover, an inspection and destruction regime was established for 
eliminating the WMD threat.  The U.N. Special Commission (―UNSCOM‖) 
and the International Atomic Energy Agency (―IAEA‖) performed their 
missions until Saddam Hussein refused to grant inspectors access in 1998.  
At that time, ―it could not be excluded . . . that there still existed undeclared 
missiles, chemical weapons and biological weapons.‖  HANS BLIX, DISARMING 
IRAQ 29 (2004).  The United States and the United Kingdom responded with 
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different.  Certainly, many nations who ultimately opposed 
military action seemed to support the effort to determine the 
nature of the Iraqi threat.  For example, according to its foreign 
minister, even France attempted to leverage all available 
intelligence in its possession.165  The United States‘s inability 
to prove a positive—that Iraq did indeed possess WMD—was 
easily exploited by opponents to the U.S. policy precisely 
because the United States had accepted the burden of proving 
that Iraq constituted a threat to international peace and 
security.  However, it was equally plausible—and perhaps even 
more rational—to focus on the lack of evidence to prove the 
negative—that Iraq did not possess WMD.  This absence of 
proof of non-possession, when linked to Iraq‘s long history of 
evading U.N. disarmament efforts and violating international 
obligations, could certainly have been relied upon to assert that 
Iraq represented a presumptive threat to the United States, 
requiring opponents of the conflict to rebut that presumption—
had the United States not accepted the burden of persuasion. 
Ironically, it is fair to say that, at the time the United 
States initiated the collective security process, most European 
intelligence agencies concurred in the assessment that Iraq 
still possessed WMD.  Opposition to the United States‘s 
assertion of its right to act in self-defense, particularly when 
such a policy was supported by the United Kingdom and 
endorsed by the U.S. Congress, would have not only required a 
masterful articulation of the absence of evidence, but also a 
direct challenge to the right of two prominent members of the 
community of nations to make the judgment of when such 
 
military force (Operation Desert Fox) to degrade Iraq‘s ability to produce, 
store, maintain, and deliver WMD.  Although a new inspection regime was 
set up in late 1999, see S.C. Res. 1284, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1284 (Dec. 17, 1999), 
it would take another three years until the inspection teams of the U.N. 
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (―UNMOVIC‖) could be 
deployed.  In the final report by UNMOVIC on March 7, 2003, the Executive 
Chairman, Hans Blix, could not conclude whether or not Iraq had disarmed.  
This ultimately led Secretary Rumsfeld to make the oft-quoted remark that 
―the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence,‖ a comment that seems to 
reflect a pragmatic characterization of the burden shifting theory addressed 
in this Article.  Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, Remarks at Department of 
Defense News Briefing (Feb. 12, 2002), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2636.  
See also BLIX, supra, at 112. 
165. See DOMINIQUE DE VILLEPIN, TOWARD A NEW WORLD 42 (2004). 
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action was required.  In short, opponents would have been 
placed in the difficult position of asserting that the policy of 
self-defense for a superpower, supported by the world‘s most 
capable intelligence community, should be dismissed based on 
speculation.  In this regard, it seems that rejection of such a 
legal basis could have represented as significant a threat to the 
viability of the inherent right of self-defense reflected in Article 
51 as the abuse of that right represents to the collective 
security paradigm.  Such an outcome would not be 
advantageous for any state, particularly smaller ones. 
The other aspect of utilizing the theory of self-defense that 
might have accrued to the diplomatic benefit of the United 
States would have resulted from invocation of the U.N. 
Charter.  This might have resulted in more European support, 
even if the interpretation of Article 51 was subject to criticism.  
It seems clear that European governments, as well as their 
people, generally view the U.N. Charter as the fundamental 
cornerstone of international peace and security.  This is 
reflected in the results of polls regarding military action 
against Iraq.  When Europeans were asked to express their 
views regarding unilateral military action by the United 
States, the results indicated a support level of only eighteen 
percent, at the same time that sixty-six percent of the 
interviewees confirmed that Iraq was a threat to world 
peace.166  However, when asked to express their views 
regarding military action in accordance with the U.N. Charter, 
support increased substantially.167 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
The United States‘s decision to invoke the collective 
security process of the U.N. Charter, and thereby to accept the 
burden of persuasion on the international diplomatic plane, 
and then to subsequently abandon that process when it became 
clear that it could not carry this burden, resulted in numerous 
direct and derivative undesired effects.  It propelled the United 
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States to proffer the ―coalition of the willing‖ as a 
manifestation of international legitimacy for Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.  It also forced the United States to rely on Security 
Council resolutions dating back to the first Gulf War as a legal 
basis for military action.  This reliance led to a blurring of the 
line between collective security and self-defense as a rationale 
for military action, with the United States asserting the role of 
de facto enforcer of the collective security interests of the 
international community, despite the fact that the collective 
security mechanism of that community chose not to endorse 
such enforcement.  This ultimately resulted in that mechanism 
being marginalized altogether.  Finally, and perhaps most 
significantly, it presented traditional security partners with a 
dilemma resulting from the desire to follow the traditional path 
of supporting the United States, and the requirement to 
manifest respect for international law.  This rendered it 
virtually impossible for several European governments inclined 
to support the United States to do so. 
Despite the Bush Administration‘s dismissal of the efficacy 
of the United Nations during the lead-up to Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, continuing support for the ―Charter security 
paradigm‖ was clearly manifested by the strained 
interpretation of Gulf War Security Council resolutions that 
were ultimately relied upon by the United States as legal bases 
for the conflict.  It therefore seems plausible that a theory of 
legality firmly rooted in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, with 
the accordant shift of the burden of persuasion to opponents of 
the inevitable conflict, might have enhanced the perceived 
international legitimacy of the military action, and thus 
accommodated the interest of the United States in avoiding 
any endorsement of theories involving use-of-force legality that 
were not nested within the Charter paradigm.  Such an 
approach would have immediately shifted the burden of 
persuasion to the opponents of military action, who would have 
been in the difficult position of articulating why, within the 
broader context of the terrorist threat manifested by the 
attacks of September 11, the United States was unjustified in 
effecting regime change to ensure security from a rogue state 
believed to possess exactly the type of mass casualty 
capabilities so obviously coveted by terrorist organizations.  
Such a diplomatic approach to the conflict would have most 
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effectively exploited the Charter paradigm from an information 
operations perspective, and potentially resulted in enhanced 
support from traditional allies and partners—even if these 
states might have been troubled by the United States‘s 
interpretation of that article. 
If the United States is yet again faced with a national 
security dilemma involving threats of imminent attacks by 
North Korea or other actors, the United States should, from the 
outset, compare and contrast the two principal avenues of 
approach related to collective security and inherent self-
defense, respectively, as its legal basis for accomplishing its 
strategic objective. 
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